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FROM THE EDITOR
More than one popular media outlet has asked whether
feminism is dead. Certainly we know that rumors of its death
have been greatly exaggerated. But what some of the queries
reveal is wonderment about activism. Activists of every sort—
not just feminist—have sought innovative and creative avenues
for effecting social change. Protesting has not lost its power, but
door-to-door organizing, email campaigns, online petitions and
blogs, civic organizations and lobbying, and even legislative
initiatives have come to replace some of the in-your-face/inyour-street political activism that characterized earlier years in
the feminist campaign. Moreover, as feminist theory continues
to make in-roads in theory and practice, activism changes or
adapts in order to seek new goals or advance new ideals.
Sharon Crasnow asks about the proper role of activism
in scientific inquiry in her article, “Activist Research and the
Objectivity of Science.” Contrary to the more common view
that activist commitments “impede gathering, interpreting,
and evaluating evidence and thus compromise objectivity,”
Crasnow argues that “activism is one of the means through
which standpoint can be achieved.” She employs the particular
case of an anthropologist who, because of her activism with
the women of her study community, came to see not just the
effects of oppressive practices but also the social structure that
maintained it. Crasnow’s article is suggestive on a number
of levels. In addition to encouraging scholars to see the
practical challenges of their theories, it expands what might
be understood as activism. Can our scholarship be seen as
activism insofar as it pushes the boundaries of traditional theory
or challenges oppressive structures within that theory?
Carmela Epright’s comments in “Praxis and the ‘F’ Word:
Young Women, Feminism, Fear” come at an interesting time.
A recent article in Newsweek magazine featuring a discussion
with Linda Hirshman sparked numerous hostile responses.1
Hirshman had said that women must work outside the home
in order to have a political voice. Most of the letters in response
claimed that feminism is about choice, and women’s decision
to stay at home should be affirmed by feminists rather than
disparaged.2 As one letter writer put it, the view that women
must work outside the home “is extremely skewed and goes
against the entire concept of what feminism stands for. My
understanding of feminism is that it’s the right for a woman to
choose the path that is best for her, whether that be working
a full-time job or being a full-time mom.”3 Another indicated
that her experiences in parent organizations and community
volunteer opportunities gave her the political power and social
honor Hirshman claimed was only possible through paid work.4
These letters might be written off as simplistic understandings
of feminism, but that might be a mistake. They offer sometimes
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careful analysis of class and race bias in a liberal feminist claim
for women’s right or duty to work in the paid labor force. They
also reveal a sort of paradox as the goals of feminism appear
accomplished to some, while others among us view sexist
oppression as well-entrenched and in need of further feminist
response.
Epright examines this phenomenon of the paradox of
feminism as advocate for personal choice by sharing some of
her students’ responses to an introduction to feminist theory
class. Epright’s sometimes wry look at how feminism is received
by conservative college students adds a subtlety to the analysis,
including the students’ own reluctance to recognize how
oppression might structure their lives. She argues, “Because
feminist theory recognizes that there are contradictory and
confusing questions to be asked about women’s experience,
embracing feminism as a way of being in the world, as opposed
to merely viewing it as a way of reading and thinking through
texts, would require them to accept more ambiguity and tolerate
more complexity than their familial, religious, and cultural
conceptions will permit.” As teachers of feminist theory, many
of us have confronted the dilemma Epright discusses. Her article
offers a helpful way to think through our obligations as teachers,
activists, feminists, and philosophers.
The rest of the issue features fourteen book reviews ranging
from feminist philosophy of science to maternal bodies and
care, from feminist critiques and appropriations of canonical
figures to contributions of specific feminist philosophers.
Reviewers do us all a tremendous service, and I would like
to express my gratitude to the many people who have written
reviews for this Newsletter. New books continue to come in—a
sign of our ever-present activism within the academy—and new
reviewers are needed. If you would like to write a review, please
send me your CV by email. This is an excellent opportunity for
established scholars and graduate students alike.
Endnotes
1. “Fast Chat: Managing Mommies,” Newsweek, (June 19, 2006):
10. Hirshman’s book is Get to Work: A Manifesto for Women
of the World (New York: Viking, 2006).
2. Letters: “The Mommy Wars Rage On,” Newsweek, (July 10,
2006): 26 & 30.
3. Ibid., 26.
4. Ibid., 30.

ABOUT THE NEWSLETTER ON
FEMINISM AND PHILOSOPHY
The Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy is sponsored by the
APA Committee on the Status of Women (CSW). The Newsletter
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is designed to provide an introduction to recent philosophical
work that addresses issues of gender. None of the varied
philosophical views presented by authors of Newsletter articles
necessarily reflects the views of any or all of the members of
the Committee on the Status of Women, including the editor(s)
of the Newsletter, nor does the committee advocate any
particular type of feminist philosophy. We advocate only that
serious philosophical attention be given to issues of gender
and that claims of gender bias in philosophy receive full and
fair consideration.

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES AND
INFORMATION
1. Purpose: The purpose of the Newsletter is to publish
information about the status of women in philosophy and
to make the resources of feminist philosophy more widely
available. The Newsletter contains discussions of recent
developments in feminist philosophy and related work in other
disciplines, literature overviews and book reviews, suggestions
for eliminating gender bias in the traditional philosophy
curriculum, and reflections on feminist pedagogy. It also informs
the profession about the work of the APA Committee on the
Status of Women. Articles submitted to the Newsletter should
be limited to ten double-spaced pages and must follow the
APA guidelines for gender-neutral language. Please submit four
copies of essays, prepared for anonymous review. References
should follow The Chicago Manual of Style.
2. Book Reviews and Reviewers: If you have published a book
that is appropriate for review in the Newsletter, please have
your publisher send us a copy of your book. We are always
in need of book reviewers. To volunteer to review books (or
some particular book), please send the Editor a CV and letter
of interest, including mention of your areas of research and
teaching.
3. Where to Send Things: Please send all articles, comments,
suggestions, books, and other communications to the Editor:
Dr. Sally J. Scholz, Department of Philosophy, Villanova
University, 800 Lancaster Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085-1699,
sally.scholz@villanova.edu
4. Submission Deadlines: Submissions for Spring issues are
due by the preceding September 1st; submissions for Fall issues
are due by the preceding February 1st.

NEWS FROM THE COMMITTEE ON THE
STATUS OF WOMEN
Once again, Sally Scholz has produced an informative and
excellent Newsletter issue. I always look forward to its
publication. I find it one of the best publications available
on recent advances in feminist scholarship in particular and
gender-related scholarship in general.
This last year the Committee on the Status of Women
(CSW) was particularly active. We arranged two panels at each
of the Division meetings. Tracy Edwards organized a panel on
“Ontology of Race and Gender” and a panel on “Pornography
Revisited” at the 2005 Eastern Division meeting. Sharon Crasnow

organized a panel on “Women’s Choices: Family Matters in
the Profession” and a panel on “Publishing as a Feminist” at
the 2006 Pacific Division meeting. Anita Superson organized a
panel on “Teaching in a Climate of Conservation” and a panel on
“Feminism and Disability” at the 2006 Central Division meeting.
Among the co-sponsors of one or more of these panels were
the Committee on Inclusiveness, the Committee for the Defense
of Professional Rights of Philosophers, and the Committee on
Philosophy and Law. The CSW makes a point of collaborating
whenever possible with other committees attentive to the voices
and interests of women philosophers.
As usual, the CSW focused some attention on (1) structural
issues such as the Committee on Committees’ criteria for
selection of new committee members and chairs and (2)
financial issues such as the size of the annual budgets provided
by the National Office to the various standing and diversity
committees. In the main, however, the CSW reflected on the
fact that despite all the progress women in the profession
have made, philosophy remains what may be the most malepopulated field in the humanities. According to available APA
data, a persistent 75 percent male/25 percent female breakdown
seems to be our profession’s continuing fate. Moreover, as
Margaret Urban Walker has noted, a “discussive/professional
tipping point,” at which women’s ways of thinking, doing, and
speaking are just as likely to be the order of the day as men’s,
does not occur until a profession is well over 30 percent female,
most usually 50 percent female. The profession of philosophy
must work harder to attract more women to its ranks, to make
gender part of philosophy’s “must-know” critical repertory, and
to serve the interests of all women in the profession, including
those who work in its margins. Based on considerable anecdotal
information (empirical data is in short supply), there is reason to
think that a significant number of women philosophers are not
tenure track and/or members of the APA. Some of these women
have Ph.D.s, but many of them terminated their studies at the
MA level. They work in community colleges and in prep schools,
or as part-timers at universities and colleges. Some of these
women work where they do because it is their choice to do so.
Others work where they do because they are bound by their
partner’s geography, limited by their funds, and/or burdened
by familial obligations. In addition, there are the women who
drop out of philosophy, many of whom leave the field because
they find it arrogant, competitive, and pedantic.
Over the next three years or so, the CSW will work to
encourage more women, particularly women from underrepresented groups, to enter and stay in the profession. Please
contact me or any other CSW member if you wish to help with
this initiative and/or if you had ideas about how to organize it.
Appreciatively to all the women in the profession. It is better
for our active presence!
Rosemarie Tong
Chair, Committee on the Status of Women
Distinguished Professor in Health Care Ethics
Director, Center for Professional and Applied Ethics
Department of Philosophy
The University of North Carolina–Charlotte
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ARTICLES
Activist Research and the Objectivity of
Science1
Sharon Crasnow

Riverside Community College
1. Introduction
Political activism is often seen as antithetical to the objectivity
of science. This is the case even for the social sciences, despite
their role in shaping the social world. Although engagement
might improve science by increasing its relevance to the needs
of the communities under investigation, this usefulness is
usually thought to be confined either to the context of discovery
or applied knowledge. It is not immediately obvious how activist
commitments could be evidentially relevant. To the contrary, it
is frequently argued that such commitments impede gathering,
interpreting, and evaluating evidence and thus compromise
objectivity. As a consequence, activist social scientists face
professional criticism and experience conflict between their
training and their political commitments.
Traditional conceptions of objectivity identify it as a
requirement for good science and locate it in scientific
methodology. Methodologies that promote objectivity are
impartial, neutral, and autonomous; both the research and
the researcher are required to have these characteristics.2 In
addition, it is typically thought that an objective methodology
will result in an account of the objects and their relationships
to each other that is independent of the researchers. I will
refer to these two aspects of objectivity as the justificatory and
ontological aspects of objectivity.
Activist research challenges at least the first of these and
quite possibly the second as well. To do research as an activist
is to adopt an explicitly value-laden methodology, and so to
challenge the norms of impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy.
I sketch an alternative account of objectivity that would not
automatically rule out such value-laden activist research as
good science. In order to do so, I use resources from a modeltheoretic account of science and standpoint theory.

2. Model-based objectivity
In order to explicate “model-based objectivity,” I will be using
an understanding of “model” akin to Nancy Cartwright’s.3
According to Cartwright, theories do not represent the world
directly and models do not constitute theories. “There are not
theories, on the one hand, that represent and phenomena,
on the other hand, that get represented (though perhaps only
more or less accurately). Rather…models mediate between
theory and the world.” 4 Models might be physical, scale
models, mathematical, conceptual, representations, analogies,
drawings, or even narratives. The most important aspect of a
model is that it provides a means for our interaction with the
world in order to achieve a particular goal. Since our goals are
diverse, it is not surprising that there is diversity of models.
Ronald Giere has compared models to maps in order to make
this clearer.5 There are many sorts of maps, topological, road
maps, trail maps, and others. Each is appropriate for different
purposes and yet each accurately captures some key features
of the natural world.
How can this model-theoretic approach offer us insight into
the objectivity of science and how activism could contribute
to that objectivity? Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison offer the

following observation: “All sciences must deal with this problem
of selecting and constituting ‘working objects’, as opposed to
the too plentiful and too various natural objects.”6 Daston and
Galison suggest a modeling of what they call the “working
objects.” I will call these the “objects of scientific knowledge.”
A systematic body of knowledge, such as science, requires that
we make choices about which features of the complex and
multifaceted natural world we will pay attention to and which
we will ignore. The results of these choices are the modeled
objects of scientific knowledge.7 Precisely how models are
related to the world may vary depending upon the nature of the
objects in the world and the goals that we have. It is possible
to build models of the objects of scientific knowledge from
features of the everyday objects in a variety of ways depending
on our needs and interests.
Model building depends on determining which features of
everyday objects are relevant. These choices are constrained
by previous choices, theory, background knowledge, and
interests. We identify characteristics that we believe will allow
us to answer the questions before us at any given time. These
questions are expressions of our interests, and it is because of
those interests that we focus on certain aspects of the world
rather than others. The interests themselves are shaped by
awareness of particular features of the world, which are, in turn,
dependent on background knowledge. The question of whether
these features are the “right” ones is a broadly empirical
question. Do the models that we construct enable us to do what
we want to do in the world? Are we able to intervene as we had
hoped? Are we able to successfully meet our goals and address
our interests? The answers to these questions constitute further
empirical constraint on the objects of scientific inquiry. When
models are successful, we have grasped the objects of scientific
knowledge in a way that supports our interaction with the world.
When models are successful in this way, then they are objective.
It is this that I refer to as “model-based objectivity.”
Model-based objectivity provides a way of thinking about how
activist research can count as objective, both in the ontological
sense and in the justificatory sense. Modeling requires choosing
properties of the complex objects in the world (whether they are
social or natural). But which properties are relevant depends on
interests, values, and background knowledge. The properties of
the objects are independent of us (hence ontological objectivity),
but their existence alone does not tell us which ones should
be important to us. Knowledge in aid of particular political or
social goals will be shaped by those interests. The success of the
model in achieving the desired goals allows us to determine the
objectivity of the model in the justificatory sense.
This brief sketch does not address the vexing issues that
arise as we begin to make such judgments about interests
and values. In activist research, the interests of the researcher
should be aligned with the interests of the community.
However, the actual interests of members of a society, culture,
or group studied may not be identical with the stated interests
of individual members of that group. What should be valued
may not be the same as what is actually valued. The question
of how to identify interests is a difficult one.
One way to tackle this problem is through standpoint
theory. Feminist social scientists advocate designing research
projects that begin from the lives of the oppressed. In order to do
this, they focus on the experiences and voices of the oppressed,
as well as their social location. In addition, the collective
statements of the oppressed, such as lawsuits, manifestos,
and other political actions, are a means of identifying these
interests. Though no one means provides the key, each helps
in coming to understand the standpoint of those whom the
knowledge serves.
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A standpoint is not the same thing as a perspective, and
the epistemic privilege that accrues from a standpoint is not
automatic.8 Standpoint approaches require not only adopting
the perspective of those studied but also recognizing the social
and political structures of everyday life that contribute to that
perspective. The objects and circumstances are not modeled
from the precise perspective of those who are being studied,
but the modeling begins in their lives, with their concerns,
their work, and their relationships. However, the model must
ultimately reveal the power structures through which their lives
are shaped and the relevance of these factors to their lives.9
Standpoint theory helps reveal which properties of the world
are relevant in this way and how the objects of (social) scientific
knowledge should be modeled.

3. An Example: Models of mothering
Nancy Scheper-Hughes describes herself as a “militant
anthropologist.” She claims that her anthropology is
“phenomenologically grounded…an anthropologia-pe-nochao, an anthropology-with-one’s-feet-on-the-ground.”10 Her
Death Without Weeping: The Violence of Everyday Life in
Brazil is an account of life in a shantytown in Northern Brazil,
the Alto de Cruzeiro, Crucifix Hill, in a town that she refers to
as Bom Jesus da Mata.11 The book is an account of the ways in
which poverty, hunger, and infant mortality are “normalized”
in the Alto. Her work is feminist in the following way: “This
ethnography…is women centered, as is everyday life in the
shantytown marginalized by poverty and set on edge by
what I describe…as ‘nervous hunger’. Mothers and children
dominate these pages even as they dominate, numerically and
symbolically, Alto life.”12
Scheper-Hughes began her study with the idea that
motherhood is a natural and universal relationship.13 Given
a model of mothering that accounts for the bond between
mother and infant as natural, much of the behavior of the
women of the Alto is seen as a result of the distortion of that
natural relationship. Her interaction with and study of these
women ultimately leads her not only to reject the model of
mothering as natural but, in doing so, to revise her research
questions. Ultimately she models mothering as a social/cultural
phenomenon rather than a natural one.
Mother love is anything other than natural and instead
represents a matrix of images, meanings, sentiments,
and practices that are everywhere socially and
culturally produced. In the place of the poetics of
motherhood, I refer to the pragmatics of motherhood
for, to paraphrase Marx, these shantytown women
create their own culture, but they do not create it
just as they please or under circumstances chosen
by themselves. …The following discussion obviously
makes no claim to universality.14
Instead of asking how the natural emotional bond between
infant and mother is altered in situations of scarcity, ScheperHughes asks how those in a culture shaped by scarcity and
poverty form the bonds between mothers and children.
If mothering is natural, the primary cause of high infant
mortality would be sheer scarcity. Mothers would lose
children only because they lack access to adequate food and
medical care. It follows that making food and medical care
available should decrease infant mortality.15 Infants who were
in immediate danger can be “rescued,” rehydrated, and fed.
But, in practice, such “rescues” turned out to be temporary.
Frequently, these same infants returned to homes where they
died of dehydration or starvation at a later time, even when
food and medical care were available.

Scheper-Hughes develops an alternative account that is
both consistent with and supports her more radical political
ideology, an ideology that is grounded in liberation theology
and begins from the standpoint of the women of the Alto. Her
analysis identifies a culture of “bad faith” in which none of
the participants accepts full responsibility for their part in the
“everyday violence” of the society, including, but not limited
to, high infant mortality.16 There is an understanding in the
community that many infants will die and that these deaths are
necessary so that others may live. This culture of bad faith is
one of the causal mechanisms through which infant mortality
persists.
Scheper-Hughes had come to see the high infant mortality
rate as “normal” when she first lived in the Alto in the 1960s
while in the Peace Corps. She came to accept it through
participating in the daily lives and struggles of the women of the
Alto. When she left, it took her several years to re-establish her
sense of outrage. Her subsequent training as an anthropologist
made the dual vision of the insider/outsider available to her
when she returned to the Alto in the 1980s. Scheper-Hughes
writes that after her first year of fieldwork she was confronted
by a group of Alto women who informed her that they would
not cooperate with her on any future work unless she also
joined them in their political struggles. “The women gave me
an ultimatum: the next time I came back to the Alto I would
have to ‘be’ with them—‘accompany them’ was the expression
they used—in their luta, and not just ‘sit idly by’ taking field
notes. ‘What is this anthropology anyway to us?’ they taunted.”17
When she returned to continue her fieldwork, she returned as
a campanheira anthropologist, both an insider and outsider.
Activism contributed to Scheper-Hughes’s account in a
variety of ways. At the most basic level, it provides both ScheperHughes’s entrance into the problem (through her early Peace
Corps activism and later relationship with these women) and
her ability to have access to her “data,” the lives of the women
of the Alto, when she returns as an anthropologist. Second, her
involvement in the lives of these women (through her activism)
enables her to design her project so that it addresses their
needs in the actual context in which they have those needs,
both understanding their adaptation to the circumstances of
scarcity and, at the same time, recognizing the factors that give
rise to this adaptation through the dual vision of standpoint.
The details of how the women see their children, how they
distinguish those they expect to live from those who are just
“visitors,” is crucial to Scheper-Hughes’s model of mothering.
There is a third way in which activism works here, and that is
in the testing of the model. The model is 1) accepted by those
it describes and 2) more effective in meeting their goals than a
model that holds mothering as natural and so focuses entirely
on addressing scarcity.
Scheper-Hughes’s account is not objective according to
the standards of impartiality, neutrality, and autonomy. It is not
autonomous because it is developed with a particular set of
values in mind and the model is intended to serve those values.
It is not neutral in that it has value consequences. Whether or
not it is impartial is not as clear, however. According to Lacey,
an account is impartial if it is assessed in terms of cognitive or
epistemic values only. The choices that go into building a model
depend on values, the ends for which the model is constructed.
But these choices also must be empirically adequate. The
epistemic requirements are only met in a way that already
incorporates other sorts of values. Attempting to distinguish
contextual, non-epistemic criteria from epistemic criteria would
be misleading, though if one is clear about the specific features
in particular contexts there is a sense in which one might do this.
However, to argue that only epistemic criteria are being used to
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make judgments about which theories are better is misleading
because all epistemic moves are predicated on holding
particular values constant. The model is deeply contextual and
it is the context itself that feeds our understanding of how to
use the epistemic values in that context.

4. Conclusion
The discussion of the example above is only a suggestion for
how standpoint theory could be understood in conjunction
with model-based objectivity. Activism is one of the means
through which standpoint can be achieved. In the case of
Scheper-Hughes’s research, activism was a necessary condition
for achieving standpoint because access to at least some of
the evidence would have been impossible otherwise. But her
activism also motivates her to seek an alternative model of
mothering, and it is only in light of that model that particular
phenomena become evidence. Additionally, her activism
contributed to a better understanding of the role of culture in
maintaining the undesirable status quo.
If we hold the model constant, we can still distinguish
a context of discovery and a context of justification, but we
must be clear that this distinction is conceptual only—not a
distinction between two separate moments in the production
of scientific knowledge. Consequently, to think of activism as
confined to the context of discovery is to fail to recognize the
interactive nature of the model as a tool and the role it plays in
enabling the researcher to determine which phenomena are
to be considered as evidence and which are not.
I have argued that a focus on determining which values,
epistemic or non-epistemic/contextual, play a legitimate role
in theory choice is misplaced. Values of all sorts play a role
in model construction. Determining which models are good
cannot be accomplished through determining whether values
are used or which ones but, rather, through which models are
successful at achieving legitimate goals. Worries about the
legitimacy of values and hence the science shaped by them
should be directed toward the scrutiny of goals.
Traditional philosophies of science base evaluation of
theories on an understanding of justification that takes theories
to be linguistic entities. A model-theoretic approach reframes
the issue so that the success of the model is evidence for
accepting it. Evidential relevance is linked to choices that
determine model construction. A model that does not get at
the properties of the world that are relevant to achieving goals
will be less successful at achieving those goals. Engagement
with and commitment to such goals may well be necessary
in order to identify relevant properties. Activism can be an
important avenue through which such meaningful engagement
can occur.
But activism also provides a route through which the
effectiveness of the model can be examined. When modelbuilding is in aid of specific goals, the failure to achieve those
goals will reveal a lack of fit between the model and the world.
Working back and forth between the model and the world in
order to achieve desired goals, producing knowledge in aid of
those goals, not only supports activism but reveals how activism
can be part of objective social science.
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be clear that I am not claiming that we construct the world.
It is the model that is constructed, and the scientific objects
are part of the model.
S. Harding. “A Socially Relevant Philosophy of Science?
Resources from Standpoint Theory’s Controversality,”
Hypatia, 19:1 (2004): 25-47; A. Wylie. “Why Standpoint
Matters,” in The Feminist Standpoint Reader, edited by Sandra
Harding (New York: Routledge, 2004): 339-51.
This modeling does not require that we assume that the
interests of everyone within a group to be served are the
same. Whether and where there are commonalities is
an empirical matter. The success of the model helps us
determine this.
N. Scheper-Hughes. Death Without Weeping: The Violence
of Everyday Life in Brazil (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1992), 4.
The name of the town is a pseudonym; however, the
shantytown (Alto do Cruziero) is referred to by its actual
name.
Scheper-Hughes, 1992, 25.
Scheper-Hughes (1992) identifies this idea with Sara
Ruddick’s work on mothering.
Scheper-Hughes, 1992, 341-42.
This is a simplification in order to highlight the general
structure of the argument.
She adopts an explicitly existentialist ethics and cites Sartre
as a source for “bad faith.” Scheper-Hughes, 1992, 209-10.
Ibid., 18.

Praxis and the “F” Word: Young Women,
Feminism, Fear
Carmela Epright
Furman University

In this article I will ask more questions than I answer about
our obligations, goals, and desires as feminist scholars. I focus
here not upon research but upon the teaching of feminist
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philosophy across the generations. Specifically, I ask what we
can, what we should, expect of our students not in terms of
their academic work but with respect to their personal and
political commitments.
Each term I begin my feminist philosophy course by
explaining to my students the multiple goals that such a course
must aim to achieve. These include: introducing critiques of
the traditional conceptions of gender and sexuality; exploring
the myriad and unconscious ways in which these conceptions
color and inform our understanding of the world; outlining
the systemic subordination of women and members of sexual
minority groups; and examining the impact that this oppression
has not merely upon the lives of individual women but upon our
shared understandings—our language, metaphysics, ontology,
epistemology, and conceptions of morality. Pursuing these
educational goals is no small task, and I harbor no illusions that
my course can or does achieve them all. When preparing to
teach this course I also ask myself whether I ought to attempt
to achieve another goal, one that cannot be explicitly shared
with the students. I wonder whether it is (or should be) my
responsibility to not only introduce my students to feminism’s
alternative approach to thinking through philosophical problems
but to encourage my students to become feminist activists and
adopt feminist politics. Am I obliged to promote the notion that
“genuine” feminism shows itself in action and thus that any
study of it requires an understanding of its theoretical tenants
as well as adoption of its social and political commitments?
Although I reflect on these questions each time I teach
my feminist philosophy course, I must acknowledge (with
tremendous embarrassment) that a recent mainstream film—a
Julia Roberts’ vehicle no less—inspired me to consider these
questions anew. Let me explain. I was in Italy with a dear friend,
who also teaches applied ethics and feminist philosophy. After
days of traveling we were desperate to watch a movie, any
movie, as long as it was in English. “Mona Lisa Smile,”1 was our
only option. I will spare you most of the details of the plot. Suffice
it to say that Julia Roberts plays Catherine Watson, an art history
professor at Wellesley College in 1953. Her students are affluent,
tenacious, and smart; they are also completely enmeshed in a
culture that views one of the most prestigious colleges of its day
as little more than a finishing school. According to the plot, it is
openly acknowledged that most Wellesley students are seeking
their so-called “Mrs. Degree”—few of them expect to pursue
further education or a career outside of housewifery and child
rearing. Professor Watson is stunned by this and views it as a
tremendous waste of talent and potential.
In response, Watson pushes her young charges and
introduces them to “radical ideas” (such as the apparently
shocking view that there is artistic value in the paintings of
Jackson Pollack), while attempting to convince her brightest
students to recognize their own potential and to pursue
something beyond marriage and motherhood. According to
the film, Yale law school holds three slots open for “Wellesley
Girls” each year. (Who knew that affirmative action existed for
privileged white people in the 1950s?) In the movie’s climatic
moment, Watson badgers a particularly gifted student to
postpone marriage and pursue a law degree. She even shows
up on the student’s doorstep in an effort to beg her to fill out
the application.
The student blithely informs Professor Watson that choice
takes many forms. I am, the student seems to be saying,
choosing to remain subordinate to my husband (who is, by the
way, less intelligent and industrious than am I). I am choosing
to abandon my intellectual potential, and for you to even
suggest that this choice is problematic is to abandon your own
principles. Don’t you teach because you believe that young

women should be free? Is not the point to give us choices? Well
this is my choice. So there.
I am not quite sure what the rest of America made of this
little speech about the purported internal inconsistency lurking
in the soul of this feminist (and by extension, all feminists), but
my friend was ready to chalk the movie up to “bad first wave
feminism” and turn in for the night. Yet, as corny as the film
was, I was a bit disturbed. Of course, I understand my friend’s
dismissal—it is not clear whether academic feminists have
ever held the stereotypical and flat-footed view that choice
constitutes liberation and, thus, that the content of one’s choices
is irrelevant. Indeed, such criticism—and from such a dubious
source—should ring hollow. Moreover, feminist scholarship long
ago moved beyond simplistic discussions of personal choice
and on to multicultural, post-modern, and psychoanalytic
approaches to feminist philosophy. As academics we view
feminism as a scholarly, theoretical approach to asking
and answering epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical
questions—and these are, by necessity, farther removed from
(although, most of us would argue, not irrelevant to) personal
choices and political questions. Most feminists remain deeply
committed to political questions—this is, after all, why most of
us started asking philosophical questions in a uniquely feminist
way in the first place. Yet feminists now have sessions at the
American Philosophical Association meetings (the stodgy
Eastern Division, no less). We address complex philosophical
questions—and, for the most part, feel little compunction to
explain ourselves to Hollywood screenwriters, much less to
fictional movie characters portrayed by actresses. Certainly,
there remains a disturbing number of fellow academics who
do not take feminist scholarship seriously; nevertheless,
departments routinely hire feminist theorists and, occasionally,
top journals publish our articles.
My purpose here is not to challenge all of us to attend more
rallies and do more activism—although I, for one, really should
be doing more of this work. Rather, I want to ask how feminist
philosophers ought to navigate the continuing dichotomy
between theory and praxis—and how we ought to explain
this tension to our students. To what end do we teach our
discipline? Is my purpose to introduce students to feminism as
a philosophical system, an alternative, often better approach to
the asking and answering of philosophical questions? Am I to
teach Luce Irigaray as I might teach, say, Descartes or Hume?
Or am I allowed to hope that the questions raised in my feminist
philosophy seminar actually have a profound effect on the lives
and the life choices of my students?
Perhaps I should explain my own unique teaching situation.
I live in a small southern city that often seems stuck in the
1950s. I teach at a small liberal arts university that The Princeton
Review once cheerfully referred to as “the most conservative
top-ranked liberal arts university in the U.S.” My students are
overwhelmingly white and wealthy. They are smart, well
trained, and academically and politically well connected. Some
of them are also fundamentalist Christians—which is to say that
they interpret the Bible as the literal word of God, and as the
last appeal on any subject be it personal, moral, political, or
philosophical. A small minority is so committed to this system
of belief that they will, for example, passionately defend slavery
because they take it to be true that it is biblically ordained. So
too is the subordination of women. Indeed, the inferior status of
women and slaves is, these students point out, neatly delineated
in a single passage of Ephesians, “Slaves obey your masters.
Women obey your husbands. And this is how you obey God.”2
Had I not heard multiple students refer to this passage as a
means of defending one or another form of oppression, I never
would have believed that nice, well-educated, suburbanite
college students could possibly believe such things. Nor would
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I have imagined that I could ever refer to the holders of such
beliefs as “smart.” However, for reasons that I hope to make
clear, I have decided that it is dangerous and naïve to suggest
that they are anything less.
Perhaps others do not confront such issues in their
classes, but I hardly need to point out that our country is going
backward rather than forward with respect to such political
commitments. I suspect that all of us will be addressing students
with such beliefs in the years to come. From this perspective,
my students ought to be viewed less as anomalies and more
as the proverbial canaries in a coalmine defined by the rise
of religious conservativism and reinforced by a second Bush
administration.
In light of my students’ religious and political commitments,
it is heartening to note that many of them find feminist
philosophy intriguing and intellectually stimulating. I am not
merely reporting that my course always fills and that it frequently
runs a waiting list; I am saying that they are really interested in
feminist philosophy. They are engaged and reflective; they write
fascinating journal entries on the works of Friedrich Engels,
Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Simone de Beauvoir, and Mary
Daly. They apply their theoretical knowledge to the standard
introduction to feminism questions such as the media’s
portrayal of women and the social construction of gender, but
I have also been treated to papers concerning intersexuality,
psychoanalytic approaches to rape trauma, and investigations
concerning women’s complacency in their own oppression.
Moreover, my students are required to participate in service
learning projects—they tutor the children of battered mothers,
answer phones at a rape crisis center, do intake interviewing
at Planned Parenthood. I make these opportunities available to
students so they may see the connections between the theories
that we study in class and the reality of sexism, subordination,
and oppression that continues to impinge upon the lives and
futures of many women.
Nevertheless, even this engaged scholarship seems to
have little effect on these women’s life choices. In the end
most report that they are personally affected only by a watereddown version of liberal feminism that carefully leaves open the
possibility that they can choose the lives that they were planning
to choose anyway—marriage right after college, children,
and secondary status in their relationships with men—which
includes deference to their husbands’ decisions and careers. I
would not have predicted that after careful analysis of Marilyn
Frye’s Politics of Reality students could walk away believing that
commitment to the view that women, like men, are rational
beings and thus that they ought to be entitled to autonomy
is a radical view. Yet I have frequently had the Julia Roberts
experience of standing on the doorstep as a student points
out that it was my course that taught her that she is entitled to
make choices, and thus that my questioning of such choices
is condescending and even oppressive. I heard a polite version
of this most recently from a former student who graduated
with 3.9 GPA and then promptly got married—one week after
graduation. She is currently expecting twins. Her most recent
email reads in part: “My husband has a great new job, and
I’m sure that my degree in psychology will make me a better
mom.”
In point of fact, I am sure that the academic training that
these women receive will make them better mothers, partners,
and housewives. Yet, am I wrong to hope for more for them—to
wish that they could pursue a life that is not exclusively devoted
to serving their families? Is it oppressive for me to believe that
they should want what the men in their lives take for granted:
a family as well as projects that have meaning, whether or not
they served the needs and desires of their family members?

I have come to believe that these students are not afraid
of feminist ideas per se; indeed, they seem more than willing
to engage even the most radical of these ideas in the safety
of the classroom, in the work that they share with other
class participants and with their professor. Yet most remain
unconvinced that these ideas can and should transcend the
academic project, and many find it irritating—if not downright
offensive—that our discipline insists upon problematizing what
they take to be normal and natural gender roles that are not
obviously and explicitly abusive or oppressive. Because feminist
theory recognizes that there are contradictory and confusing
questions to be asked about women’s experiences, embracing
feminism as a way of being in the world, as opposed to merely
viewing it as a way of reading and thinking through texts,
would require them to accept more ambiguity and tolerate
more complexity than their familial, religious, and cultural
conceptions will permit. Embracing feminism as a life project
means accepting that one’s relationships are likely to be less
clearly defined and thus more complicated, and it requires one
to expect and accept the resistance and discontent of family
members and friends who wish to maintain the status quo.
In short, embracing feminist practice means that one’s life
is going to become more difficult. Such a life necessitates an
expansion of one’s self past academic engagement and requires
one to take a critical stance with respect to traditional—and
often comfortable—gender norms, values, and behaviors. It
also demands empathy for other women and requires that
one take responsibility not just for one’s own life but, as Lisa
Maria Hogeland pointed out in “Fear of Feminism: Why Young
Women Get the Willies,”3 feminism requires one to develop the
empathy to cross “differences, histories, cultures, ethnicities,
sexual identities” and even “otherness itself.” 4 Thus, accepting
the system that feminist scholarship offers means embracing
one’s own responsibility, vulnerability, and, perhaps most
difficult of all, it means embracing an uncertain future. In
Hogeland’s words:
The central tenet that the personal is the political
is profoundly threatening to young women who do
not want to be called to account. It is far easier to
rest in silence, as if silence were neutrality and as
if neutrality were safety. Neither wholly cynical nor
wholly apathetic women who fear feminism fear
living in consequences. Think harder, act more
carefully; feminism requires that you enter a world
supersaturated with meaning, with implications.
And for privileged women in particular, the notion
that one’s own privilege comes at someone else’s
expense—that my privilege is your oppression—is
profoundly threatening.5
Moreover, feminist praxis asks students to consider the
ways in which they personally are vulnerable to oppression.
As Hogeland points out, violence against women continues
to permeate college campuses; nevertheless, most women
still believe that women’s equality has been achieved. Surely
colleges and universities have achieved a modicum of success
over the last four decades in providing women students
with more or less an equal education, and this means that
young women are less likely to experience overt, first-hand
discrimination. But in many cases this modest success
contributes to a false sense of security and, more disturbingly,
a tendency to attribute sexual discrimination, violence, or
harassment to the actions and reactions of the individuals
involved, rather than to systemic forces. “Sexism seems the
exception, not the rule—and thus more attributable to individual
sickness than systems of domination.”6 For this reason, women
may feel encouraged to study feminism as a historical concept,
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to think about it as a problem for women who are “not like
us,” or to pathologize individual victims or perpetrators than
to accept the notion that they too are vulnerable and thus that
there are powerful personal reasons to take the questions raised
by feminism seriously in one’s own life.
More than a decade after Hogeland’s article appeared in
Ms. magazine, I am left wondering if this fear—not of feminist
theory, but of feminist engagement—has become more,
rather than less, profound. The feminist critique of traditional
theory continues to be inspiring, but the commitments that
emanate from feminist practice seem even more daunting and
demanding—especially for women born under the Reagan
regime and raised during the first Bush administration. With
respect to my wealthy, conservative students it means not
merely rethinking their privilege but perhaps even abandoning
their religion, or at least considering the consequences of their
religion’s tenants upon oppressed people.
My purpose with respect to this discussion is not merely
to share my displeasure about the rise of new conservatism
and its effect upon the life choices of young women. Surely
I am perplexed and disappointed, but I also think that there
is progress to be noted even in light of the dilemma to which
I am pointing. For example, in the 1990s numerous scholars
lamented young women’s fear of feminism and their tendency
to believe that all feminists were lesbians—or, more to the point,
that homosexuality, bisexuality, and transgenderism were to be
rejected out of hand, as were all critical inquiries concerning
the nuclear family. It now seems almost quaint to read articles
that worry about the perception that all feminists are man-haters
rather than serious scholars interested in critiquing gender
privilege in public and private spaces and in our theoretical
and philosophical conceptions. More recently, progressive
thinkers rejected feminism insofar as it was viewed as the
exclusive domain of first-world, middle-class, white women
and critiqued for failing to take seriously the privileges and
punishments inherent in class, race, and geographic situation.
While such objections continue to be relevant and essential,
today they are at least somewhat less deserved, prevalent,
and stinging. They are also less likely to prevent students from
taking our classes.
All of this cheery news notwithstanding, with what are we
feminist teachers left? Am I to be satisfied with students who
will gladly investigate the complex, nuanced questions asked
by feminist theory, but who will steadfastly refuse to recognize
these questions as personal challenges? While their failure to
embrace the praxis of feminism means that students are only
getting half of what feminism offers, I may have no choice but
to accept this partial answer from at least most of my students.
As disappointing as this answer is, there are things that I am
unwilling to do to change it. I will not suggest that feminist
practice is safe, that taking it seriously as a life commitment
demands no sacrifice, no rethinking of values. Nor will I
suggest that choice alone—any choice—constitutes a feminist
commitment. Indeed, more often then not, feminism requires
one to stand opposed to their culture, to be critical of their
culture’s benefits and its institutional support. Sometimes—
often—it is not in one’s immediate interest to take such a
position. But, as Hogeland points out,
We do our best work in “selling” feminism to
the unconverted, when we make clear not only
its necessity, but also its pleasures: the joys of
intellectual and political work, the moral power of
living in consequences, the surprises of coalition, the
rewards of doing what is difficult. Feminism offers
an arena for selfhood and personal relationships but
not disconnected to them. It offers—and requires—

courage, intelligence, boldness, sensitivity, relationality,
complexity and as sense of purpose.7
Despite my disappointment, I have come to accept that
being a teacher of feminism means that I will be required
to continually plead my case about the responsibilities and
pleasures associated with feminist praxis. I have also come to
expect that, more often than not, the door will be slammed in
my face—even after the woman closing me out has read the
literature that I have to offer. The worth of this endeavor, as in
all teaching, lies in the students who do come to accept the
complexity and the joy inherent in the entire feminist project—
the theory as well as the praxis—those who come to recognize
their own vulnerability as well as their power to impact their
own situation and the situations of other women.
Endnotes
1. 2003; Mike Newell, Director.
2. Editor’s Note: Ephesians 6:5 & Ephesians 5:22
3. Lisa Maria Hogeland. “Fear of Feminism: Why Young Women
Get the Willies,” Ms., November/December, 1994, pp. 18-21.
4. Ibid., 20.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 21.
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Inclusive Feminism: A Third Wave Theory of
Women’s Commonality
Naomi Zack (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., 2005). 224 pp. $22.95. ISBN: 0-74254299-8.

Reviewed by Clea F. Rees

University of California–Santa Cruz, cfrees@imapmail.org
Naomi Zack argues that feminists lack a suitable definition
of the term “women,” which prevents truly global theoretical
and practical change. If one rejects the idea that all and only
women share some inherent characteristic, regardless of
social and historical context—as could be assumed on the
basis of now discredited biological accounts of exactly two,
unambiguous sexes, for example—then one confronts the
socially and culturally constructed nature of the category. Given
the variety of societies and cultures experienced by different
women, one seems forced to choose between a definition
that effectively excludes many women and what amounts to a
merely disjunctive definition. Earlier feminists, who claimed to
speak for all women and to be resisting a common oppression
and patriarchy, were soon confronted by the parochial character
of their own experiences, shaped as they were by other aspects
of their social identities. Not all women are oppressed to the
same extent or in the same ways, and the ways in which other
factors—class, race, creed, sexuality, health, etc.—affect how
they are oppressed is not, as it soon emerged, equivalent to
the result of some simple mathematical function of, say, the
oppression suffered by a white woman and the oppression
suffered by an Asian man. A disjunctive definition is, Zack
argues, equally unsatisfactory because it undermines the
possibility of speaking and acting as women. Feminist resistance
requires a notion of women that reflects something women
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share just in virtue of being women. Zack’s proposal, then, aims
to respect women’s differences, without losing sight of what is
genuinely shared. She argues that:
An essence can be something that all members of
a group have in common, which is a necessary and
sufficient condition for membership in that group. In
this meaning, all women un-controversially share the
same essence that can be defined like this. Women are
those human beings who are related to the historical
category of individuals who are designated female
from birth or biological mothers or primary sexual
choice [sic] of men. Call this category FMP…[The]
relation of assignment to, or identification with, the
FMP category is a necessary and sufficient condition
for being a woman, and there is every reason to view
it as an essence shared by all women. (8)
Although this proposes a shared identity, because it is “not
substantive” (8), it is consistent with the reality of diversity.
Nevertheless, it provides, Zack argues, a sufficient basis for
feminist social theory and politics. Feminist theorists must
re-engage with women generally and serve the practical
and political needs of a global feminist activism. Because
her definition includes all women, Zack argues that it is
possible for feminists to develop the sort of inclusive feminist
framework necessary for global political change. Zack argues
that women remain historically and politically invisible,
despite their apparent, if partial, success in so-called First
World democracies. Women who have succeeded in public
and political life have done so only by accepting androgynous
roles within institutions originally organized by men, resulting in
serious conflicts with women’s, but not men’s, non-androgynous
private lives. Zack argues that such women are not succeeding
as women—as individuals who have been categorized as, or
themselves identify with, FMP. The reluctance of so-called Third
World feminists to advocate such androgyny should not be
dismissed or confused with genuinely conservative attachment
to “traditional” female roles.
Zack’s definition and subsequent discussion of feminist
social theory and psychology lays the foundations for her own
positive political proposals. Why, she asks, have feminists not
suggested women take political power, and ruled instead of
men? This is not to deny the existence of formidable obstacles.
Zack argues, however, that there is at least some reason to think
not only that women’s rule is possible but that it is the only hope
for humanity. Despite its contingency, the historical and social
construction of FMP, combined with their numbers, renders
women the only group practically able to challenge the current
political and economic system. What is required, however, is not
simply that women take the political reins and continue where
men left off but, rather, that they do so as women. According
to Zack, this requires a “revaluation”—an undermining of the
current capitalist and consumerist system—by distinguishing
goods with (mere) price from those with dignity and recognizing
the latter as priceless rather than valueless.
Zack’s vision is of political change through democratically
successful women’s parties who attract the votes of many
women and some men. Such political parties would put women
in power by campaigning on platforms reflecting women’s
values and concerns.
Women’s parties have platforms with policies
to implement common objectives of peace,
environmental preservation, sustainability of women’s
work, social services for mothers and children,
universal educational opportunities, and universal
healthcare. There might be variation in both the forms

of these objectives and in the endorsement of other
objectives, such as gay marriage, higher minimum
wage, abortion rights, racial integration and affirmative
action, legalized prostitution, animal rights, and human
population control. The two universal objectives of
rule by women would be the end of violence and
preservation of natural environments. (164)
Although Zack is correct in claiming that women make up a
large enough proportion of the electorate (in many democratic
societies with universal suffrage) to elect such women’s parties,
it is not clear that Zack is entitled to any degree of optimism
here. Zack uses the Norwegian political situation, together
with examples of women’s activism in the so-called Second
and Third Worlds, to support her claim that a women’s party
would promote the necessary revaluing. Although she admits
that women elected to Norway’s legislature typically vote along
(men’s) political-party lines, and that many of the examples she
cites of women opposing extreme violence, social chaos, and
dire poverty aim to ensure continued support for traditional
women’s roles under patriarchy, she, nonetheless, takes these
as offering partial support for the possibility of her vision.
What is especially problematic, in my view, is the idea that
women—that is, those who are assigned to, or identify with,
FMP—just as women, would form political parties with the
sort of platform described. Why should just identifying with
FMP—let alone merely being assigned to it—suggest that one
values non-violence or ecological sustainability?
Should one really expect most women to vote for such a
“women’s” party? Zack does not deny that lesbians, AfricanAmericans, etc. are oppressed differently as women, but, if
that is true, it is unclear what reason they might have to support
a party that fails to support—or even opposes—same-sex
marriage or racial integration, for example. Unless one thinks
that such a party’s policies would address injustices they suffer
as women (but not as lesbians or members of racially oppressed
groups), it is unclear why one would think such a party could
represent them. This raises the possibility that what makes
Zack’s definition inclusive is precisely what renders it unsuitable
as a foundation for the political project.
Zack’s emphasis on women in democratic societies with
universal suffrage is also noteworthy. If global women’s rule
is truly humanity’s only hope, and this is to be brought about
through the election of women’s parties in such societies, the
large number of women not living in such societies must be
great cause for concern. To alleviate such pessimism one might
turn to a rather different vision for change, suggested by Zack’s
own examples. In countering the worry that men will not step
aside willingly—or peacefully—to make way for women’s rule,
Zack points to examples of successful nonviolent struggles for
justice, including Mahatma Gandhi’s independence movement,
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s civil rights campaign, and women’s
struggles for suffrage. If one needed further examples, one might
turn to the tumbling of the Berlin Wall, Czechoslovakia’s Velvet
Revolution, and more. What strikes me as interesting about
all these cases is that none involves change via the ballot box.
These are cases concerning nonviolent resistance by exactly
those groups denied such an opportunity.
Whether or not one finds Zack’s proposals satisfactory, their
true value may lie in stimulating further reflection on the nature
of satisfactory feminist and, ultimately, human, ideals.
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For some feminist researchers, the central tenet of feminist
epistemology—that knowledge reflects the particular
perspective of the subject—is invaluable for uncovering
androcentric bias in scientific theories and methodologies.
However, others disagree. On their view, epistemological
theorizing and the concept of situated knowledge only invite
unnecessary problems to feminist science studies. So argues
Sharyn Clough in her recent book Beyond Epistemology: A
Pragmatist Approach to Feminist Science Studies. According
to Clough, “epistemology is not the most effective focus for
feminists engaged in science criticism” (2).
Her book is divided into eight chapters. Chapters one and
two set the stage for Clough’s negative thesis by identifying
the problematic aspects of epistemological theorizing.
Clough explains that epistemological approaches tend to
focus on abstract questions about normative properties of
truth and objectivity. On her view, it is an inquiry motivated
by representationalism: a philosophical model that invokes a
metaphysical gap between knower (the subjective inner mind)
and the known (the objective external world). On this model,
scientists, and knowers in general, interpret empirical data
through gender or political schemas. Of course, if knowers
are mere interpreters of some external world, then it is always
possible that one’s belief about that world is inaccurate, biased,
or partial. So, in order to defeat this global skepticism and
bridge the metaphysical gap between knowers and the world,
epistemologists attempt to isolate the normative properties that
would make their theories “true” or “objective.” Unfortunately,
Clough believes that these attempts ultimately fail. As long as
representationalism is a given, no amount of epistemological
evidence will guarantee that feminist claims about androcentric
science are objective. In other words, when feminists critique
science from an epistemological perspective, they unnecessarily
invite the skeptic to ask: “What is the guarantee that feminist
views are not themselves biased or partial?” For Clough,
feminists’ ongoing engagement with representationalism robs
their views of any epistemological bite: “If we attempt to address
the oppressive elements of science at the level of epistemology,
then the global skepticism toward which epistemology is
directed can be used against our own well-justified claims about
the instance of scientific bias and abuse” (29).
In chapters three, four, and five, Clough carefully examines
the works of numerous feminist philosophers of science,
including Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Evelyn Fox Keller,
Sandra Harding, and Helen Longino. In these chapters, Clough
examines the problematic aspects of epistemology in general
and those that seem to affect feminist versions of epistemology
in particular. In chapter three, Clough considers Blackwell’s
(1875) criticisms of Charles Darwin’s theory of sexual selection.
According to Blackwell, Darwin’s claim about inferior “feminine”
traits was not based on objective empirical measurement but,
rather, on his “extra-empirical” commitments to sexist Victorian
norms. Blackwell argued that feminist critics of science must be
critical of the fact that (subjective) worldviews and experience
filter our access to the objective world. Yet, unlike Darwin’s
theory, Blackwell insists that her particular view (that women

and men have different but equal mental capacities), accrued
by virtue of her experience as a woman, is objective. But Clough
is right to point out Blackwell’s inconsistency here: If worldviews
and experience filter and bias the facts, then why accept
Blackwell’s view as an objective claim about the epistemic
privilege of women’s experience? Clough’s analysis goes on
to show that Blackwell’s epistemological argument relies on
overgeneralizations and elements of feminist essentialism when
she assumes that her own experiences (as an educated, white,
American woman) are representative of other women and
that there are experiences that all women share. But Clough is
mostly concerned about Blackwell’s representationalist tone
and how it ultimately undermines her criticisms of Darwin’s
sexist theories. After all, within the epistemological framework,
the skeptic can still ask, “What is the guarantee that the facts
about sex selection can ever be accessed directly, unfiltered
by feminist worldviews?”
Chapter four is devoted entirely to Clough’s analysis of
biologist Evelyn Fox Keller’s early works (before 1985). Clough
focuses on Keller’s reliance on psychoanalytic theory and her
attempt to develop the idea of “dynamic objectivity.” Clough
explains that “dynamic objectivity” is based on psychoanalytic
object relations theory, which explains the differences in men
and women’s cognitive styles in terms of their differences in
psychosexual development. Generally, dynamic objectivity
refers to feminine ways of knowing where one utilizes a mode
of perception that is based on loving attention and engagement.
It emphasizes a two-way interaction between scientist and her
object of study. On Keller’s view, this non-hierarchal approach
is superior to “masculine” ways of knowing, since it does not
express a neurotic need to maintain an independent self by
dominating the object of study. But for Clough, since object
relations theory entails biological determinism, Keller’s latter
claim that anyone (male or female) can develop dynamic
objectivity is inconsistent. Keller’s characterization of feminine
ways of knowing and the masculine gendering of male scientists
also causes Clough to voice concern, “because Keller’s
theory requires the use of these overgeneralizations…her
representationalist attempts to champion objectivity and
defeat relativism continue to be unsuccessful, and her thesis
is considerably weakened as a result” (76-77).
In chapter five, Clough argues that the early epistemological
theories of Sandra Harding (works before 1993) and Helen
Longino (works before 1990) encounter similar problems.
Although both theorists promote a conceptual midpoint on
the epistemological continuum between objectivism and
relativism, Clough insists that they remain uncritical of the
representationalism that underwrites the debate. Consider
Harding’s notion of “strong objectivity.” Because she argues that
all beliefs have a social filter, Harding disavows the claim that
standpoints of women will produce true or objective beliefs.
Instead, she introduces a new epistemological position called
“strong objectivity.” Strong objectivity encourages scientific
researchers to include the examination of background beliefs
into theories in the hopes of maximizing objectivity. But on
Clough’s view, Harding’s proposal remains representationalist.
When knowers are conceived as interpreters with social filters,
no amount of strong objectivity will defeat skepticism and its
variant epistemological relativism. Hence, according to Clough,
“the important goals of feminist science studies are best met
not be addressing (unanswerable) epistemological problems,
but by focusing back on local, empirical research” (5).
Clough develops her positive thesis in chapters six and
seven. As she sees it, a Richard Rortyan interpretation of Donald
Davidson’s philosophy of language will afford feminist critics of
science with a nonepistemological and more effective option.
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Clough explains Davidson’s theory of language as a pragmatic
model for belief and meaning, one that considers beliefs or
values not as filters through which empirical data passes but
as important strands in one’s (empirically-based) web of other
beliefs. Interbelief comparison is where all justification happens
on this model. So, there is no metaphysical gap to bridge and
no need for independent epistemic criteria from which to judge
all theories and beliefs. A statement’s veracity is based on the
background of other beliefs, which arise from “a triangular causal
relationship between three naturalized entities—ourselves,
other speakers, and our shared environment” (108). In this
way, Davidson’s model of meaning and language is both
nonepistemological and nonrepresentational. Unlike other critics,
Clough does not think of Davidson as a coherence theorist since
“[He] makes the holistic point that empirical data plays a causal
role in establishing the content of all beliefs” (110). So, the belief
that women are oppressed is ultimately supported by empirical
evidence (i.e., documented cases of women being excluded
from science and other cultural institutions).
Because it responds to local, changing, and complex
realities, Clough suggests that Davidson’s pragmatic alternative
will liberate feminist science studies from theoretical
inconsistencies and rigid (sex) categories. To illustrate this point,
Clough considers Margie Profet’s scientific theory about the
evolutionary function of menstruation in chapter eight. Utilizing
Davidson’s philosophy of language, Clough effectively shows
that feminists can detect certain strains of androcentrism in
this case but without the burdens of global skepticism. She also
suggests that pragmatic contributions may explain why Profet’s
innovative arguments for menstruation have been met with very
little critical response in the scientific community.
Clough’s feminist pragmatism is a valuable contribution
to the feminist critique of science. Although her argument is
compelling, I suspect that some readers might question Clough’s
suggestion that Harding and Longino are representationalists.
That is, one could argue that they, like Clough herself,
understand beliefs not as mere filters that conceptualize
data but as background assumptions necessary for making
inferences from data to theory. Nevertheless, I enjoyed reading
her book and recommend it to anyone who is interested in
understanding the complex relationship between beliefs,
values, and scientific facts.

Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology: An
Examination of Gender in Science
Edited by Cassandra Pinnick, Noretta Koertge, and
Robert Almeder (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 2003). ISBN: 0-8135-3227-2 (pbk).

Reviewed by Sharyn Clough

Oregon State University, sharyn.clough@oregonstate.edu
The rhetorical direction of the essays collected in Scrutinizing
Epistemology is exemplified by a two-part claim spelled out by
the editors, Cassandra Pinnick, Noretta Koertge, and Robert
Almeder, in their short introduction to the text. First, they claim,
philosophers of feminism have begun to have a substantial
impact within epistemology and philosophy of science. Second,
now that philosophers of feminism have some institutional
power, these philosophers are refusing to allow their views to
be subject to critical scrutiny (2-3). Hence, conclude the editors,
the importance of their book, which claims to offer an antidote
to the current situation.

That philosophers of feminism have had a substantial
impact within epistemology and philosophy of science is, of
course, an empirical claim, but the editors offer no quantitative
data to support it. For example, the editors claim that feminism
as applied to science and the philosophy of science is being
“embraced” in academic settings (2), a development that has
led to “course revisions, additions in academic departments,
and establishment of special courses in newly created
academic departments—women’s studies or gender studies”
(2). No data are given to support these informal observations,
certainly nothing that would support the claim that feminist
approaches in epistemology and philosophy of science are
being “embraced.” Against such an informal, anecdotal
account, philosophers incorporating feminist approaches in
their work can marshal their own contrary accounts regarding
their troubles with tenure, curriculum review committees, and
editorial boards. Clearly, more formal data is needed to make
any clear claims one way or the other.
Unphased by the lack of data, the editors of Scrutinizing also
note an “increased tendency” to include feminist viewpoints
within “traditional philosophy and philosophy of science
classes” (2). The evidence the editors provide for this claim
is a list of four philosophy of science readers that include
sections on “social constructivism” and “feminist dimensions”
(2). I think the editors’ claim about the “increased tendency”
to include feminist viewpoints is probably true, but on its face
the claim does not tell us much. It certainly does not tell us
whether the viewpoints are being presented first rather than
second-hand, whether the viewpoints are being featured as
positive contributions to the philosophy of science literature,
or are, instead, tucked into the back of a textbook never
to be covered in the average semester-length class, and/or
accompanied by discussions of “relativism” that dismiss the
feminist contributions through guilt by association. In one of the
volumes referenced by the editors, Robert Klee’s Introduction
to Philosophy of Science (Oxford, 1997), the ninth chapter
of ten, called “The Politics of Epistemology,” references the
work of Sandra Harding, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Helen
Longino but also discusses the anti-feminist contributions made
by Pinnick and Koertge and is followed by a final response
chapter titled “The Actual Way Things Really Are.” In Jennifer
McErlean’s introductory volume Science, Reason, and Reality
(Wadsworth, 2000), referenced by the editors, the penultimate
chapter covers feminist issues but also includes essays by
Pinnick and Koertge that argue against a number of claims
made by feminists. In the third text cited by the editors (S.
George Couvalis, The Philosophy of Science, Sage, 1997), the
discussion of feminist issues in science comes in the sixth of
seven chapters, following a discussion of “Relativism and the
Value of Science.” Janet Kourany’s text (Scientific Knowledge,
Wadsworth, 1998) is the only one of the four cited by the editors
that includes feminist themes as positive contributions to each
of the sections on traditional subject areas. Of the fifteen or so
philosophy of science collections I have been sent by publishers
over the last few years, Kourany’s is the only text that does this.
I would be pleasantly surprised to hear that my collection of
texts is unrepresentative in this respect.
Of course, when gauging the impact of feminist approaches
on the field of philosophy of science and epistemology, it is
also important to discuss the presence of feminist content
in key national conferences. But here, of course, the editors
are silent as even they cannot point to any but the most token
presence of feminist discussions of science in any Philosophy
of Science Association (PSA) meetings over the last decade
(the most recent 2004 PSA meeting marked a slight increase
in this respect), or in the field’s leading journal, Philosophy of
Science. At her session of the 2002 PSA meeting, Noretta Koertge
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claimed that, during her tenure as editor of the journal, there
had been a lack of good feminist work available to publish,
as well as a lack of philosophers willing and/or able to review
such work positively. It is important to note also that the only
discussion of philosophy and feminism at the 2002 PSA meeting
was Koertge’s own panel, devoted to criticizing feminist science
studies. This observation, along with the inclusion of antifeminist commentaries in the philosophy of science textbooks
cited by the editors, contradicts the editors’ claim that criticism
of feminist science studies has been kept from philosophical
discourse by the academic policing of feminist philosophers.
Of course, there have been a number of smaller specialized
conferences over the last decade that have focused positively on
feminist approaches to science and the philosophy of science
(e.g., “The Women, Gender and Science Question” conference
in 1995 at the University of Minnesota; the “enGendering
Rationalities” conference in 1997 at the University of Oregon;
the “Feminism and Naturalism” conference in 1999 at the
University of St. Louis at Missouri), but here it is impossible to
ignore the internal critical engagement with, and examination
of, feminism, epistemology, and science evidenced in the
programs of these meetings. Very little is taken for granted at
these conferences. The same feminist scholars that Pinnick et
al. claim are unwilling to question “the feminist story” (3) spend
much of their time doing just that.
So much, then, for the sloppy and unsupported arguments
about the influence of feminist philosophy of science that are
provided by the editors in their introduction to Scrutinizing. The
essays that make up the rest of the book offer little to improve
the quality of analysis. I should note that a number of insightful
and fairly detailed reviews of these essays are already available
online,1 so I will continue with more general and thematic
comments.
The essays are divided into four sections: 1) The Strange
Status of Feminist Epistemology; 2) Testing Feminist Claims
about Scientific Practice; 3) Philosophical and Political Critiques
of Feminist Epistemology; and 4) Future Prospects of Feminist
Epistemology. Five of the thirteen essays are reprints from
Susan Haack, Christina Hoff Sommers, and Pinnick. Koertge
contributes two original essays, as do philosophers of feminism
Kourany and Sharon Crasnow. Of the original contributions to
the collection, these latter two stand out, as both philosophers
make a valiant effort to stem the tide of sloppy, ad hominum
argumentation that characterizes most of the other essays. In the
end, however, Kourany and Crasnow are overwhelmed by the
company they keep. One expert on the feminist science studies
literature, Alan Soble (who knew?) contributes an original essay
about Evelyn Fox Keller’s work on Barbara McClintock, though
only if one means by “original” something like “contains critical
arguments made better, elsewhere, by other feminists, ten years
ago.” (More on the lack of originality below.) The collection
would definitely have benefited from the inclusion of essays
by Harding, Longino, and Keller, whose work is criticized in a
number of the essays in Scrutinizing. These three prominent
feminist theorists have responded to these sorts of criticisms
before and have modified their views in important ways over
the last ten years. None of this is obvious from the way that their
work is treated in this book.
The first section of the book is clearly the most important.
As the editors emphasize, the essays it contains “lay out the
groundwork for the more detailed critiques that follow” (6).
The reader will be dismayed to discover, then, that the editors’
introduction to the section begins with a characterization of
feminist epistemology that so misses the point of what feminists
have been up to that any remaining trust the reader might have
in the expertise and competency of the editors is bound to be
badly shaken.

The editors begin: “Epistemology is the study of the
acquisition and structure of knowledge. Feminists advocate the
rights of women. But what might a ‘feminist epistemology’ be?”
(4). The editors offer two alternatives. The first is that, perhaps,
feminist epistemology is that sort of epistemology that “will help
liberate women in a much more direct and efficient way than
will traditional accounts of knowledge” (4). The second is that,
instead of informing the content of the epistemology in question,
perhaps feminist epistemology is that sort of epistemology that
has been practiced, historically, by philosophers who were
animated by feminist political goals (4). The editors decide that
it is probably a mix of these two.
Unfortunately, the main project of feminist epistemology
is not captured by either of these descriptions but is rather
best expressed something like this: “Feminist epistemology
focuses on a particular failure of objectivity, namely, sexism,
and aims to rearticulate epistemological guidelines, and notions
of objectivity, that would guard against this failure.” Is this not
what it is all about? How could the feminist interest in, indeed
impassioned focus on, objectivity, and various failures to achieve
it, not feature in a description of feminist epistemology?
Perhaps the failure to acknowledge the feminist focus on
objectivity is related to the fact that so many of the authors in this
text accuse feminist epistemologists of embracing relativism. I
happen to agree that many feminist epistemologists end up with
some version of relativism2, but the reason that I have bothered
to make this observation is because I know that it has incredible
normative force with the very feminists I criticize. All of the
feminist philosophers discussed in Scrutinizing are committed
to objectivity. Responsible criticisms of these feminist projects
need, at the very least, to acknowledge that these projects
share the goal of objectivity, even, or perhaps especially, if the
criticism is meant to highlight their failure to achieve this goal.
Crasnow’s essay “Can Science be Objective?” is one of the only
contributions to this collection that gets this right.
I conclude my review with a brief discussion of the essays
that comprise this foundational, first section of the book. The
section begins with a reprint of Haack’s “Knowledge and
Propaganda: Reflections of an Old Feminist,” first published in
1993, reprinted for her own collection of essays in 1998, and
resurrected here. Given that Scrutinizing promises to give us
“the first systematic evaluation of feminist epistemology,” the
reasons for reprinting Haack’s essays here are unclear. Similarly
for the second essay, a reprint of Pinnick’s 1994 essay, “Feminist
Epistemology.”
Perhaps the editors mean to offer a systematic evaluation
of feminist epistemology from the 1970s and 1980s, but,
then, theirs would be by no means the first. Many feminist
philosophers have critically and systematically examined work
from this earlier period and found it wanting. And while the
editors of and contributors to Scrutinizing might want to claim
that feminist philosophers “embraced” by the academy have
been busy keeping these internal feminist criticisms from being
published, the facts say otherwise. The very journals that have
been supportive of feminist science studies have been the
site of a number of critical debates (recall, for example, the
special issue of Signs debating the details of Nancy Chodorow’s
object-relations theory3; the debates about the problems of
essentialism in feminist standpoint theory collected in a special
issue on the topic4; and also the criticisms of standpoint theory,
in favor of feminist empiricism, in Longino’s comprehensive
literature review5).
In this first section of the book, reprints of these (or any)
critical works by feminists within feminist science studies would
have been a welcome inclusion. Indeed, the absence of this
sort of critical engagement with the very literature about which
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the editors and contributors claim to have expertise informs my
main complaint with the book as a whole.
Endnotes
1. E.g., Elizabeth Potter’s review is available at http://www.
wellesley.edu/WomensReview/archive/2004/10/highlt.
html#potter; and Elizabeth Andersen’s review is available at
http://www/personal.umich.edu/~eandersn/hownotreview.
html
2. See, e.g., Sharon Clough, Beyond Epistemology (Lanham,
MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
3. Signs, 6:3 (1981).
4. Signs, 22:2 (1997).
5. Signs, 19:1 (1993): 201-12.

The Mind as a Scientific Object
Edited by Christina Erneling and David Martel
Johnson (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
$98.50. ISBN: 0195139321

Reviewed by Carmel Forde

Dalhousie University, cforde@dal.ca
This well-crafted book considers two rival theses about mind’s
basic ontology, (1) that mind is the same as brain, and (2)
that mind is a product of culture. Traditional cognitive science
disciplines have had little success in reaching a satisfactory
understanding of mind, in part due to reliance upon cognitive
scientists’ “improved” Cartesianism and Kantianism, which
ironically thwart their projects. This is the thematic setting
for the collection, divided into seven sections, each treating
significant questions in cognitive science. The chapters
comprise a diverse and innovative collection by thinkers at
the forefront of their disciplines, which encompass linguistics,
history of medicine, philosophy, and psychology, as well as
biology, cognitive science, and neuroscience, all pivoting
around the question whether mind is a scientific object.1 The
volume swells with interesting chapters, covering secondary
altriciality to heterophony, genetic altruism to hermeneutics,
all in the main accessible to specialists and non-specialists
alike. This is an unusually cogent book, whose editors look
beyond the accepted disciplinary structures of cognitive science
to the environment and human culture in order to examine
“mind.” Erneling and Johnson succeed admirably in exploring
the alternative of the cultural approach to mentality, whilst
recognizing the significance of neurophysiology.
It is unfortunately impossible to review each section
thoroughly; all raise important philosophical issues. Part
One transforms the position that “psychology is dead” into
the recognition that a particular form of psychology built
upon the Cartesian/Kantian framework is bankrupt. How
ought psychology to alter? This section contains history and
background for major issues treated in the collection, covering
prior “solutions” such as behaviorism and structuralism, and
bringing forward questions developed from controversial issues.
How is psychology different from other domains of inquiry, and
upon what sort of inquiry should psychology as a science be
modeled? Harré’s careful review of the distinctions between
Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft, delineating options
for psychological studies, exemplify the clarity and accessibility
that Johnson and Erneling prize. Limitations of the experimental
method in psychology are carefully examined (e.g., Dror on the
neglected study of emotions in cognitive science). “The idea
that mental activity is brain activity has retarded research in

neuroscience,” Leahey quotes from Gaffan (69). Further, Leahey
argues mind can be “socially constructed” and be an object of
science. Just as other social constructs (he cites “money”) can
be causally significant in human lives, so too can mind.
In a chapter from Part Two, entitled “Psychology as
Engineering,” Leahey claims a strong connection between
psychology (correctly conceived) and post-Darwinian biology.
He argues an engineering perspective is better able to
accommodate the normativity of psychology than is the natural
science perspective (140). Olson’s critique of Stent’s epistemic
dualism (with use of the metaphor of “complementarity” in
physics to suggest the “twoness” of human beings) notes that
Stent has still not considered cultural influence on mind, and
the temporal stages through which anyone passes in order to
become “full members of a particular cultural group” (123). We
“become” rational animals.
Writers in Part Three agree eliminativism is false,
emphasizing different errors and solutions. The nature of
“true believers” (Henderson and Horgan) and connectionism
comprise the most technical aspects of the book. Von Eckhardt
argues that should brain be found to operate along connectionist
lines (which supports a view of cognition as decentralized, a
bottom-up approach) the “truth” of eliminative materialism
would still not entail the falsity of folk psychology. Residual
weaknesses in cognitive science’s study of linguistic knowledge
emerge, focusing upon propositions that many philosophers
have critiqued as simplistic and unrepresentative of human
knowledge (e.g., “dogs have fur”). I juxtapose Johnson’s
suggestion that “practitioners of…cognitive sciences need
to find means of taking careful…account of sophisticated
expressions of culture” (401).
Is “mind” just another name for what the brain does?
Erneling refers to metaphors used by Dror and Thomas for two
ways of studying the mind, privileging the second. “Pinocchio”
and “Frankenstein” are respectively “ghost in the machine” and
“the mind as a result of material design.” Mind is not a unitary
entity but a complex system, divided into subsystems such as
memory, attention, vision, and reasoning. However, acceptance
of the Frankenstein metaphor is not necessarily rejection of
the problems inherent in dualism. Promethean Frankenstein’s
body parts are obtained from graveyards. (At least the Attic
Prometheus was living flesh!) An important sense of living
biological humans is missing here. The relations between Leib
and Korper will be useful to future considerations. Mental activity
is presented in ways that go beyond the biological brain and
neural activity, yet all authors of Part Four accept a no-center
view of the mind, for which Johnson provides a compelling
critique (7), and which both editors reject.
Erneling introduces Part Five on evolutionary theory and
its relationship to the science of mind. Human cognition is not
the usual scientific object. Shanker and Taylor argue some
nonhuman animals communicate like infants but clearly
distinguish animal and human cognition. Gardenfors presents
a “ladder of human cognition” with interesting insights on
the “detachment of thought.” While one might dispute the
ladder’s order, his argument is clear and readable. Hattiangadi’s
fascinating discussion of aberrant CPGs and their relationship
to qualia, the significance of rhythm for consciousness, and
how illusion proves better than perceiving reality, is intriguing.
Lumsden advances the view that sociobiology can study
subjective experience objectively.
Johnson notes regarding Part Six that “the claims of
Brockmeier (and Bakhtin) [that mind is a set of linguistic
entities] need not be irrelevant to science after all, because…it
is both possible and legitimate for sciences like psychology,
linguistics and biology to take account of cultural factors like
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meaning, language, obligation, past experience and history”
(400). For Bakhurst, mind is a social phenomenon, and he
recognizes much psychological research has ignored the
sociopolitical context in which it is conducted. He is, to my
knowledge, the only writer who mentions politics (413). An
advocate of strong culturalism, he recognizes the changes
within academia that welcome situatedness.
Van Gelder argues in Part Seven that the fundamental
mistake in mind/body treats the mind as ontologically
homogeneous and simple. Jarvie’s discussion of workshop
rationality provides structure for the atmosphere of future
debate.
Erneling and Johnson’s dexterous and authoritative writings,
and editing, do not directly acknowledge feminist concerns. Yet
many features of this collection overlap with feminist interests
and queries: on the corporeal, on “becoming,” accounting for
subjectivity, avoiding constructive idealism, giving accounts of
situatedness, dealing with reductionism, and acknowledging
normativity in sciences (admittedly a partial list). As cognitive
science is a recent development in philosophy of mind, there
is reason for a smaller literature on these connections. This
work will be an excellent resource for feminist philosophers
of mind, of psychology, of evolutionary theory, as well as
accounts of science studies,2 and presents concerns that can
open new dialogue between cognitive sciences and feminist
philosophies, which can benefit mutually from interactions.
Feminist accounts of experience can offer grounds for a stronger
and more developed conception than the book provides: Joan
Scott’s writing on subjects as constituted through experience is
relevant here (incorporating the political), as is Lynn Hankinson
Nelson’s work on experience in epistemological communities,
to mention only two.
Although the text often disjoins dichotomous accounts,
it is not underwritten by an either/or logic but is informed
by a more comprehensive both/and logical structure. The
editors avoid oppositional approaches to nature and culture,
for example. Johnson views mind as intellectual invention,
rather clearly a culturalist position on mind; he considers that
cognitive sciences do not uncover information about mind
itself. Erneling claims “the mind and mindful activity are much
too diverse to be…accounted for in terms of one underlying
mechanism, either biological or cultural,” (513) and her voice
is powerful. Since mind is “ontologically heterogeneous,”
neurophysiology becomes increasingly important as a center
for cognitive science. Feminist investigations are expanding in
biology; Elizabeth Wilson writes on neurological sciences and
feminism, suggesting an examination of the neurological body
might be useful to feminist accounts of the body.3
Cognitive scientists often rely on atomistic ontology and
taxonomy, which they ought reject (517). Sue Campbell’s work
on memory is insightful in its account of links between emotion,
recollective memory, and politics and social life. “In particular,
while memory is sometimes experienced as a feature of our
interiority, human remembering takes place through action,
narrative, and other modes of representation in public space
and in the company of others.”4 Transformed sciences of mind
centering on culture and brain (and corporeality, I believe)
can only benefit from developed interactions with feminist
philosophy. I look very much forward to future collaborations
by Erneling and Johnson.
Endnotes
1. Many chapters began as conference papers for the 1996 York
University conference by the same name.
2. Nancy Tuana’s forthcoming book Philosophy of Science
Studies is to include investigations of cognitive science.

3.

4.

See Wilson’s Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological
Body (New York: Routledge, 2004) and Neural Geographies,
Feminism and the Microstructure of Cognition (New York:
Routledge, 1998).
Sue Campbell. “Our Faithfulness to the Past: Reconstructing
Memory Value,” 2005, unpublished paper.
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Reviewed by Catherine Villanueva Gardner
University of Massachusetts–Dartmouth,
cgardner@umassd.edu

Elizabeth Grosz’s Time Travels is a collection of essays written
over eight years. Together, these interconnected essays form
an argument for, and the beginnings of, a feminist philosophy
of time. For Grosz, a feminist philosophy of time constitutes a
challenge, among other things, to more generally accepted
notions of identity, gender/body, and the goals and theorizing
of feminist politics. She argues that the feminist questions of,
for example, power and identity must be placed within a larger
framework that allows for a recognition of the forces of time
and the material universe. Feminists may use these forces for
their politics, but they are ultimately not theirs to control.
Not all the essays in Time Travels deal explicitly with
feminist theorizing; moreover, within each essay there are
multiple interconnected themes and explorations. The essays
that will resonate the most with feminist philosophers are in
Part I, “Nature, Culture, and the Future,” and Part IV (the final
section), “Identity, Sexual Difference, and the Future.” Given the
limitations of space, this review will focus on these essays.
Grosz draws on a variety of philosophical resources, for
example, the work of Deleuze and Bergson as well as scientific
resources such as the work of Darwin and Kinsey. In her
analysis of the two latter figures, Grosz models the approach she
advocates for feminist readings of primary texts: an engagement
that is grounded on the assumption that each text contains
insights that can be brought to bear on feminist politics, rather
than a search for the political biases and philosophical flaws of
the text. Throughout the whole collection Grosz often takes the
approach of asking provocative questions and only supplying
suggestions for ways forward. This reflects the way that she
sees nature as giving culture a series of challenges, and time as
becoming open-ended and offering multiple possibilities.
Part I is an exploration of the Darwinian theor y of
evolution and its accompanying ontology. In the first essay in
Part I, “Darwin and Feminism: Preliminary Investigations into
a Possible Alliance,” Grosz lays part of the groundwork for
her discussion of time with an in-depth interpretation of the
Darwinian theory of natural and sexual selection that continues
throughout this first section of essays.
Grosz explores the Darwinian account of natural selection
as a dynamic principle, with random chance operating as a
central force in the evolution of a species. As such, evolution
must also be understood as being a force toward the future.
Grosz brings out the way that the forces of evolution can
encompass both the biological and the cultural. Culture is not
separate from nature, nor is it the end of evolution; rather, it
is also the product of species survival. Grosz examines the
potential for feminist theorizing of this. She argues that politics
can be seen as cultural evolution in that the feminist struggle
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itself—a struggle for survival under oppression—is the force
that produces self-transformation. Like species survival, this
feminist self-transformation is directed toward an unknowable,
multiply possible future of political change.
Part II, “Law, Justice, and the Future,” and Part III,
Philosophy, Knowledge, and the Future,” build a picture of
the conceptualizing of time that forms the basis for Grosz’s
feminist philosophy of time. The two essays in Part II, “The
Time of Violence: Derrida, Deconstruction, and Value” and
“Drucilla Cornell, Identity, and the Evolution of Politics,” explore
deconstructive notions of time in the work of Cornell and
Derrida. The focus of Part III, “Philosophy, Knowledge, and the
Future,” is an examination of Bergson’s philosophy of duration,
using the analyses of Bergson from the works of Deleuze,
Merleau-Ponty, and William James.
In chapter seven of Part III, “Merleau-Ponty, Bergson, and the
Question of Ontology,” Grosz’s exploration of the metaphysics
of Merleau-Ponty, particularly his work on Bergson, provides the
grounding for her provocative claim that there is a need, one that
has been more or less unrecognized, for a feminist ontology:
an exploration of the real. Grosz argues that feminist theorizing,
or any politics of change, cannot move forward without an
understanding of the “real,” “the force of events,” the given. In
other words, feminism needs to address questions of ontology.
We must recognize that matter is resistant to our desires and,
as such, generates the invention of solutions: things that do not
yet and might not have existed. It is this expansion of future
conceptual possibilities, what invention might bring to issues
of sexual difference and solutions for oppression, that should
be the task of feminism. This is in contrast to the generally held
feminist goal that the future is produced through the need to
change the present and is thus limited by the present.
Part IV, “Identity, Sexual Difference, and the Future,” contains
the most explicitly feminist essays of the collection. These
essays explore the interconnections between Grosz’s account of
a philosophy of time and feminist theory, in particular, the work
of Irigaray on sexual difference. Of these essays, chapter eleven,
“The Force of Sexual Difference,” and chapter twelve, “Inhuman
Forces: Power, Pleasure, and Desire,” are the most intriguing.
Chapter eleven is an argument for a third approach between
what has been set up as only two possibilities for discussions
of sexual difference: gender and body. Instead, Grosz argues
for a discussion of sexual difference as the organization of
materiality and what she calls messy biology, even though
these concepts have been seen as outside, or even contrary
to, feminist knowledge. Grosz argues that sexual difference is
a form of an unknowable future. Time must be recognized as
a force, rather than conceptualized as the passive result of the
causal effects of the present. Time is, in a sense, within objects
and is the force that directs their becoming. In chapter twelve,
Grosz offers an alternative to the socially constructed identity
and sexualities of the subject by calling for an examination of
how inhuman forces constitute them. For Grosz, the feminist
goal of the removal of the oppression of women must involve
a necessary reconceptualization of women as subjects: as
evolving multiple subjects that are produced by these forces.

Mass Hysteria: Medicine, Culture, and
Mothers’ Bodies
Rebecca Kukla (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2005). 249 pp. $27.95. ISBN: 0-7425-3358-1.

Reviewed by Laura Newhart

Eastern Kentucky University, laura.newhart@eku.edu
In Mass Hysteria, Rebecca Kukla constructs an elaborately
detailed, historically based argument for two claims: 1) Contrary
to recent trends in the scholarship on maternity, current
cultural discourses and medical practices of motherhood do
not represent a discontinuity or break from modern treatments
of maternal bodies but are rather continuous with the modern
project of controlling mother’s bodies; and 2) Feminist theories,
like those of Luce Irigaray and Helene Cixous, that emphasize
and celebrate the fluid, unbounded nature of the maternal body
reinforce the oppressive effects of that project.
The theoretical framework upon which Kukla bases her
argument consists of the opposing yet mutually dependent
relationship between two cultural representations of
motherhood, i.e., the Fetish Mother and the Unruly Mother,
which have operated in Western civilization at least since JeanJacques Rousseau placed the responsibility for transforming
the disparate perspectives of a collection of individuals into the
general will on mothers’ breastfeeding. Infants, according to
Rousseau, would imbibe patriotic values through their mothers’
milk; hence, mothers were obligated to nurse their children
and refrain from hiring wetnurses to do it for them. At the same
time, anxieties concerning the influence of the maternal body
on the quality of the fetus began to arise. Charged with the
civic duty of creating good citizens, mothers had an obligation
to breastfeed their own children and to control the conditions
both within and outside of the womb in order to create citizens
of the highest possible quality.
Mothers’ bodies became objects to be surveyed and
regulated, i.e., disciplined, and the primary means of doing this
was through the iconic cultural figures of the Unruly Mother and
the Fetish Mother. The Unruly Mother is the woman who might
let her appetites, desires, and even experiences cross over
the permeable boundary of the womb and affect her fetus in
negative ways. In order to meet her civic obligation, she must
be ever vigilant to protect the fetus from her own uncontrollable
nature. The Fetish Mother is the nursing mother who forms
a seamless, unified whole with her infant whereby the two
become one. While at face value these normative figures
appear as opposites—one a negative image to be avoided and
the other a positive ideal to be pursued—given their common
historical roots and the similarities in their effects on pregnant
women’s and mothers’ lives, it is obvious that they are flipsides
of the same disciplinary project that runs from the beginning
of the modern period to the present. Both figures play upon
the perceived lack of boundaries and identity on the part of
pregnant women and new mothers, and neither lacks support
from the medical profession, media sources, and even mothers
themselves in disciplining the maternal body to carry out the
modern normative project of creating good citizens.
In Mass Hysteria, Kukla conducts a genealogical analysis
of the contemporary cultural discourses and medical practices
of pregnancy and early motherhood much in the manner of
Michel Foucault. In her analyses of the disciplinary regimes
surrounding pregnancy and breastfeeding, Kukla utilizes
a number of Foucauldian concepts including the role of
professional medicine as a bridge between the individual and
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the state, the panopticon, and the technic as a practice of selfdiscipline in the care of the self.
Flashes of brilliance are evident in Kukla’s historical
analyses of contemporary cultural discourses and medical
practices of pregnancy and breastfeeding as continuations
of, and contributions to, this modern normative project. For
example, in her discussion of the Unruly Mother, Kukla traces
the contemporary notion of the mother and the fetus as two
distinct entities presumably at odds with each other to its
origin in the thaw of the freeze on dissection and vivisection of
the human body that gave rise to modern obstetrics. Kukla’s
historical survey of various scientific, medical, and cultural
representations of the fetus culminates with the work of Leonard
Nilsson, whose editorial choices concerning his photographs
of the fetus resulted in a historically significant photo spread
in Life magazine in 1965 and has since come to be recognized
as the image of the fetus on everything from public billboards
to medical informational pamphlets. According to Kukla, this
generic fetus has become a celebrity in its own right and now
serves to mediate the pregnant woman’s relationship to her
own fetus. This externalization of the fetus in order to open it
up to public view works in tandem with medical technologies,
like the sonogram, to abstract the fetus from the maternal body
that is then easier to view as a passive receptacle for the fetus.
Moreover, it allows the maternal body to be divided into parts to
be manipulated at will. It is from this detachable, mobile, public,
and generic image of the fetus in the womb in contemporary
Western culture that Kukla derives the title Mass Hysteria.
Moreover, in her discussion of the Fetish Mother, Kukla
claims that, in the tradition of Rousseau, the contemporary
cultural discourse around motherhood collapses into proximity,
i.e., close bodily contact, and proximity collapses into the
mouth-breast contact of breastfeeding. One striking example
of contemporary cultural discourse where Kukla notes this
synecdochic collapse is the American Academy of Pediatrics
guide to breastfeeding, which goes far beyond the medical facts
of the biological benefits of breast milk for the infant to include
testimonial statements from breastfeeding mothers, genuine
or contrived, where women claim that their infants know they
come first in their mothers’ lives because they are breastfed.
Another is the relative absence of research and information in
the culture concerning methods of getting breast milk to infants
other than breast to mouth contact (e.g., breast pumps), which
might enable mothers to leave their children for longer periods
of time to work or pursue identity-driven projects of their own.
Thus, while every other human relationship is premised on the
separate identity of the participants where time apart is deemed
necessary and healthy for preserving their separate identities,
the relationship between the mother and child is not.
Finally, Kukla discusses how contemporar y probreastfeeding groups like La Leche League International and
self-help books for new mothers like What to Expect the First
Year actually function to constitute the normatively appropriate
desires of new mothers, both sexually and otherwise. Kukla tells
the story of Denise Perrigo who in 1991 experienced biologically
normal sexual sensations while breastfeeding her child. When
Perrigo called a hotline recommended by La Leche League
concerning these sensations, she was accidentally transferred
by the receptionist to a rape crisis hotline, which promptly called
the police, who raided Perrigo’s home and took her child. Kukla
notes that while proponents of breastfeeding often idealize it
by comparing it to a sanitized romantic heterosexual union
between the mother and the infant, the real feelings of nursing
mothers are often foreclosed and even forcibly silenced. Finally,
in La Leche League’s The Womanly Art of Breast Feeding,
Kukla reports that new mothers are told that they should be

able to take a nursing baby anywhere they want to go, thereby
implying that they should only want to go to places where the
baby can go (e.g., the mall, mother-child play groups, etc.) and
not places like a library or board room where a baby would not
be welcome. The Womanly Art of Breastfeeding also prepares
new mothers for their first night out without the baby by warning
them that they might miss their baby so much that they will not
be able to enjoy it. Such advice suggests that a mother who
would enjoy a night out alone is somehow inadequate.
In sum, Kukla’s argument is that pregnancy and early
motherhood are already times of shifting personal boundaries
and a sense of uncertainty concerning ones identity. The
medical practices and cultural discourses surrounding them
take advantage of the uncertainties of the experience and
further diminish new mothers’ privacy and agency in their
enforcement of the modern normative project whereby mothers
are held responsible for the reproduction of civil society.
In the final chapter of Mass Hysteria, Kukla finds fault
with feminist theorists such as Irigaray and Cixous for their
valorization of the permeable boundaries and fluid identities
of women in general and mothers in particular.
Kukla warns:
(T)he working mother who feels she has selfishly
abandoned her infant if she allows another caregiver
to give it a bottle during the day, the expectant woman
who looks to the ultrasound monitor to be told the
moral meaning of her pregnancy, and the pregnant
woman who is scared to take antidepressants that
pose only a theoretical risk to her fetus because she is
held captive by an image of her risky and permeable
womb will not be helped to restore appropriate
boundaries and healthy integrity by the postmodern
efforts to valorize the fragmented and permeable
self. (226)
In the gray, plodding, meticulously detailed manner
of the genealogical method advocated by Foucault, Kukla
adds thought-provoking subtlety and historical nuance to the
exuberance of postmodern feminist celebrations of women’s
bodies and experience.

Socializing Care
Edited by Maurice Hamington & Dorothy C. Miller.
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.,
2006). $28.95. ISBN: 0742550400.

Reviewed by Lauren Fleming

Georgetown University, lef6@georgetown.edu
The goal of the edited collection Socializing Care is to extend
notions of care into the political realm, building on early general
work in care ethics, and specifically on Joan Tronto’s 1993 book,
Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethics of Care.
Both carefully argued and grounded in empirical research,
the essays meet this mandate while remaining accessible to a
variety of disciplines. As a collection, Socializing Care surveys
a broad range of concerns, engaging with a variety of nations
and cultures, addressing questions of both theory and practice,
looking backward to historical examples as well as forward
to policy reform. Provoking thought on such a diverse range
of themes seems particularly apt when treating a topic like
the role of care in politics, a topic in which the breadth and
interconnection of the questions themselves are still being
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determined. The component essays are able to remain broad
enough to provide further direction for developing a political
care ethics, while working closely with the particulars of political
life around the globe.
Although one might have wished for more explicit
connection of the concepts and tools developed across the
component essays, the introduction to this collection does draw
out some general themes, attempting to define the socialization
of care and briefly arguing for its relevance. In addition, the
collection as a whole does an admirable job of situating itself
within the relevant literatures, as each essay explicitly develops
its position in response to other work in care ethics, broader
philosophical camps, and empirical research. One small
drawback to each contributor doing this situating work is a
slight tendency to repetition, as in the brief discussion of Tronto’s
definition of “care” that appears in almost every essay. Such
repetition, however, may just be an unavoidable side-effect of
the admirably evident conversation among the authors and their
familiarity with one another’s work. In contrast to this repetition,
while the positions presented are clearly distinguished from
traditional liberal theory, approaches that could have provided
a more subtle foil for a political care ethics, such as Aristotelian
political theory, are mentioned with surprising infrequency.
In deference to limitations of space, I will only discuss the
essay written by Nel Noddings in more detail. As a relatively
broad discussion of how to apply care ethics in the political
sphere, her work might be considered as a foundation for
more narrowly focused essays, and both her strengths and
weaknesses seem representative of those found in the collection
as a whole. I direct those interested in a brief overview of each
of the remaining essays to the editors’ introduction, where the
quick summary of each article manages to be both succinct
and informative (xv-xxi).
In her essay, Noddings expands on her thesis from Starting
at Home: Caring and Social Policy, which is that the features
of life in “ideal” or “best homes” could inform more humane
social policies. Ideal homes are distinguished from other homes,
understood as “any group of persons who commit themselves
to establishing a shared life under one roof,” in two ways
(27). In the first place, presumably, ideal homes excel in filling
the basic role of a home, i.e., providing shelter, inculcating
children to various modes and standards of interaction, and
supporting certain sorts of attitudes toward the broader world
and the objects in it. Ideal homes, moreover, go beyond basic
or average homes because they “provide protection as well
as shelter, offer an adequate supply of material resources,
encourage growth, have at least one adult who does the work
of attentive love, and educate for a form of acceptability that is
simultaneously adapted to and critical of the cultural standards
in which the home is located” (27). While the items on this list
are fairly broad, Noddings notes that the structure of the ideal
home is flexible and constantly under construction. Whatever
the particular form, she claims, ideal homes are united by their
response to expressions of need, which is “I am here.”
Although Noddings recognizes the flexible, culturallyresponsive nature of the ideal home, her argument seems
to proceed by analogy. Thus, she does lay out a slightly more
detailed description of the ideal home, the elements of which,
she claims, are also present in the humane state. Her brief
discussion of the characteristics common to best homes and
best societies is generally sympathetic. For example, the best
families and the best states will both appreciate the different
sorts of contributions individuals can make to families and
societies, and recognize that the best parents and public
servants are those who are highly-trained, highly competent,
and given latitude to make and implement particularistic

judgments. Despite the initial plausibility of the analogy between
the ideal home and the ideal state, however, we might worry
about the appropriateness of extending this analogy in the first
place.
Noddings does recognize that there are important
disanalogies between the family and the state. For example, the
intimate relationships of the ideal home are not reproducible at
the level of the state. She responds that we can follow the ideal
home model in a more piecemeal way. But is there a principled
way to determine which pieces are applicable to the state? Once
we start to pick and choose which attitudes cultivated in the
ideal family are to be carried over into the political sphere, how
much of the insight is being generated by the concept of the
“ideal home”? While the analogy of the family relationship may
be enlightening, it seems that a lot of work is being done by the
intuitions or other theoretical commitments that we are using to
pick and choose which aspects of ideal home life are relevant.
None of this, of course, is to deny that the analogy of the ideal
home is a helpful one. Rather, the point is that in order to assess
the ideal home model, the other philosophical commitments
that fill the model out need to be made explicit.
Even if we make the model more explicit, might patterning
the state on the ideal home present some ethical concerns?
Again, Noddings recognizes that just as problems arise in the
best of families, for example, with slightly excessive use of
coercion, or doubts as to the importance of members’ needs,
so these problems will occur when the ideal home model is
applied on the social scale. My concern, however, is not with
these deviations from the ideal, which will arise on any model
of society and, indeed, in any human endeavor. Rather, are there
problems that might arise out of the “ideal family” orientation
as such? Although raised here with respect to Noddings, this
concern seems worth raising with respect to the collection
as a whole. The discourse of the state-as-family has been
historically tied to oppressive and sometimes violent nationalist
movements, with one contemporary example being India’s
Bharatiya Janata Party. Even when this extreme scenario is not
realized, there also seems to be an inherent tendency toward
paternalism in this model. If society is a family, the state seems
to take on the role of parent, the classic parens patriae. Even if
the state and its agents perform their role in the best possible
way, is this the right way to treat adult citizens? This, obviously,
is not a new question, and one key strength of care ethics is its
recognition that we are not the fully independent, autonomous
agents liberal theory takes us to be. That we need to recognize
and cultivate our relationships of dependence, however, does
not entail that these interconnections are properly analogized
to filial relationships. Focusing, instead, on the general attitude
of “I am here” may provide an alternative way of building care
into our political lives. The more humane policies that might
result from employing the ideal home model could give a sort
of consequentialist justification for taking the filial relationship
as basic. Nonetheless, a discussion of its potential weaknesses
seems necessary to assess fairly the strengths of this model. This
explicit treatment of the weaknesses of a care-centered politics
seems to be missing from the collection as a whole.
Socializing Care provides a point of departure for further
scholarly work in a number of fields, and a language in which to
evaluate and critique our current social systems in the interests
of policy reform. These essays are understandably focused
on putting forth positive pictures of care-based policy, and no
doubt some of the concerns raised here can be answered by
extrapolating from earlier debates between justice and care
perspectives. While these questions will not definitively be
answered here, if ever, in order to benefit from the rich and
thoughtful work done in this collection, broader questions about
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the compatibility of public life and a care-based approach must
be addressed.

Feminism after Bourdieu
Lisa Adkins and Beverly Skeggs (Oxford, England:
Blackwell Publishing, 2004). 258 pp. $34.95. ISBN:
1405123958.

Reviewed by Christina Smerick

Greenville College, christina.smerick@greenville.edu
Feminism after Bourdieu brings together a number of mostly
British and Australian feminist scholars who are currently
working on the intersections and conflicts between Bourdieu’s
rather inflexible social theory and feminism’s inherent call
for change. The scholars have independently published quite
a bit of work on this topic, and it is certainly to the benefit
of the reader that the varying approaches to this topic have
been organized into a single volume. In short, Feminism after
Bourdieu provides a variety of uses, reappropriations, criticisms,
and expansions of Bourdieu’s social theory.
Given Bourdieu’s seemingly notorious failure to adequately
address the role or place of gender within his overall theory, the
editors of this volume spend some necessary time explaining
exactly why feminist or post-feminist scholars of any persuasion
should feel a need to (re)engage with Bourdieu’s work. The
overall apologia is that, first, given post-feminism’s move away
from “the sex/gender distinction as one of its key objects,” a
social theorist who does not place gender as central to his work
is actually more helpful than one who organizes his corpus
around it. Secondly, Bourdieu’s social theory is useful, albeit in
a limited way, in that feminism (or, again, post-feminism—these
terms are used interchangeably throughout the introductions)
has moved away from an analysis of class and needs to return to
class issues and social theory, rather than continuing to remain
located in culture theory alone.
According to its editors, the book is organized according to
three distinctions, making the task for the reader a bit easier:
gender, sexuality and emotions, taste and culture. These three
axes weave in and out of the three divisions under which the
essays are organized. The first section of the book seems to be
a loose grouping of a variety of approaches to the intersections
between class and gender. One essay emphasizes Bourdieu’s
analysis of class but fails to address gender, thus making
it a complicated choice for a book entitled Feminism after
Bourdieu. The other essays in the first section focus almost
entirely upon gender issues and make relatively brief mentions
of Bourdieu, usually in summative fashion. For example, Terry
Lovell’s essay “Bourdieu, Class and Gender: ‘The Return of the
Living Dead?’” provides a summary of various feminist thinkers
and their approaches to capital and gender; she then finishes
the essay by bringing Bourdieu’s understanding of capital to bear
upon questions of culture, emotion, and class. She provides the
traditional critique of Bourdieu regarding gender—namely, that
he treats it as secondary, and thus it functions as doxic—but
the primary thrust of the essay is an examination of feminist
theory and its struggle with class. Reay, on the other hand,
uses Bourdieu’s theory of capital as a model and constructs
her own theory regarding emotional capital. It is a solid work,
demonstrating the possibilities of using aspects of Bourdieu’s
theory without embracing it wholeheartedly. Finally, Beverly
Skeggs (also an editor of the volume) provides a critique of
Bourdieu’s understanding of reflexivity, consciousness, and
the utter exclusion of agents onto the field, due to class value

differences. The essay demonstrates the adequacy of feminist
critiques of Bourdieu by highlighting the limits of his theory to
the possibility of change, despite his emphasis upon reflexivity
as potentially transformative self-awareness.
The second section of the book, entitled “Symbolic
Violence and the Cultural Field,” is the strongest in terms
of straightforward application of a Bourdieusian analysis or
method to gender and class distinctions, particularly in the
media. Here the book lives up to its title, as each scholar
tackles the way classed women appear in British media. The
first three essays—“Notes on ‘What Not To Wear’ and postfeminist symbolic violence,” “Rules of Engagement: Habitus,
Power, and Resistance,” and “Habitus and Social Suffering:
Culture, Addiction and the Syringe”—are particularly disturbing
(especially for this American commentator, who is less wellversed in class distinctions due to the tenacity of most Americans
in pretending such distinctions do not exist in our country), in
that one is confronted by what is very obviously gendered/
classed vitriol, which, nevertheless, passes muster with the
community at large precisely because of the presence of the
middle-class authoritative voice that reinforces class prejudice
upon the bodies of the working-class women. Here, we witness
the selective use of Bourdieu’s theories in order to analyze
and reveal the embodiment of class/gender intersections in
working-class and middle-class women, and the ways media
reinforce the stereotypes of the social field. The last essay,
“Mapping the Obituary,” deals less sensationally, but intriguingly,
with the changes to obituaries in the past hundred years in Great
Britain. What is most impressive with this set of essays is the
obvious benefit of a modified Bourdieusian analysis—while
certainly not exhaustive or the last word, the use of habitus/field
and the like to critically examine media, ad campaigns, and
even obituaries proves to be a rich methodology.
The final section, “Retheorizing the Habitus,” will be most
satisfying to those readers, like myself, who struggle with
Bourdieu’s rather pessimistic view regarding agency, yet who
do not wish to abandon his theories completely. Lois McNay
lets the conflict between Judith Butler and Bourdieu play out,
and then provides a means of transcending or eliding both
the cultural v. materialist divide in feminism, as well as the
agency-as-linguistic v. agency-as-habitus divide. Lisa Adkins
tackles the role of reflexivity in modern culture, challenging
common assertions that individualism is on the rise and that
subjects are able to reflect separately and objectively upon
their gendered roles. This essay, too, brings up the fundamental
question: How can/do things change, if both the field and the
habitus are dominant in individual lives? Adkins relies heavily
upon McNay’s work as a foil, thus reinforcing the moments
in Bourdieu’s thought where change can take place (notably,
in the lack of fit between gendered habitus and social field).
(However, whether this shift in gender traditions is a product
of reflexivity, or whether this reflexivity itself is a habitus, is the
unquestioned assumption that Adkins raises here.)
Anne Witz’s essay is, in a word, delightful. She goes after
Bourdieu with a highly humorous use of sarcasm, which
nevertheless manages not to overwhelm the piece, mostly
because her criticisms are spot-on—and she uses Bourdieu
against himself. Witz manages to correctly label exactly
what Bourdieu is doing, and thus demystifies his writings on
masculinity by demonstrating that Bourdieu himself, while
criticizing the unreflective assumptions of others, nevertheless
makes the same mistake, and thus taints his own work.
Finally, Elspeth Probyn provides a poetic, if at times confusing,
account of the role of emotions and affect in Bourdieu’s theory.
Drawing beautifully upon her own emotions of shame, she
argues for a flexibility in sociology—a willingness to engage
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the body in theory without reducing the body to a “screen”
or an unproblematic stable field. The essay works well as the
conclusion of the book in that it tentatively charts a loosening
of the dry binds of social theory and encourages thinkers to be
unafraid of ambiguity.
One of the inevitable problems that emerge when creating
a book out of a series of essays by various authors is that there is
a certain amount of repetition in each of the texts. For instance,
just about every scholar presents an encapsulated explanation
of “habitus” and “social field,” two central components of
Bourdieu’s social theory. While it is certainly worth noting that
scholars in general may explain these terms in very different
ways, one finds, in these essays, remarkable agreement
regarding their definition, if not their usage. Furthermore,
since the various essays obviously address similar topics, one
is left wishing one could witness a conversation between the
scholars, in which their similarities and differences in thought
could be brought forward and addressed directly. In other
words, the book as a whole lives up to its title—it is certainly
a book that demonstrates the various ways in which Bourdieu
is approached and used by current British feminist scholars.
One cannot help, however, but thirst for a work that engages
the scholars more directly with each other, as well as a work
that provides the main introduction to Bourdieu’s thought once,
rather than many times.
However, this is a minor complaint about an otherwise
solid example of postmodern feminist scholarship. What
is most satisfying is the refusal of the scholars to accept
Bourdieu’s theory as-is and then struggle to work within it. They
demonstrate the possibility of critiquing and even rejecting a
theory, yet nevertheless finding components of it useful for new
thought. Both feminist scholars and sociologists should find
the book helpful; feminists should take note of the generous
and creative use of a problematic theory in generating new
discourse; sociologists should take the examination of class
habitus and gender formation to heart in their subsequent
projects. Hopefully, the book can reinvigorate discussion about
not only Bourdieu but other theorists who have been summarily
dismissed due to failures in their theories to properly address
sex and gender.

Feminist Interpretations of Niccolò Machiavelli
Edited by Maria Falco (University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004). 423 pp.
ISBN: 0-271-02389-9.

Reviewed by Mindy Peden

John Carroll University, mpeden@jcu.edu
Niccolò Machiavelli’s work has a breadth of probable
interpretations, and “it is no exaggeration to say that almost
every day somewhere in the world someone is invoking
his name, either as a cautionary plea against some specific
political action or as a template for understanding particular
events” (2). It is no surprise, then, that an edited volume on
the thinker who is seen alternatively as the greatest political
theorist of all time and as not a political theorist at all would
have a wide range of interpretive essays. The approach to virtù
in Machiavelli’s work is a central concern for feminists as it is
for most scholars; departing from a rule-based conception of
virtue, Machiavelli insists that virtù is contextual and contingent,
and is oppositional though only arguably distinct from Fortuna,
memorably cast as woman both literally and figuratively. The
question of Machiavelli for these thinkers revolves primarily

around the relationship of his active and contingent conception
of virtù: if, when, how, and why virtù relates to women. In the
most memorable section of Machiavelli’s work (chapter 25 of
The Prince) the gendered conception of Fortuna turns violent,
and it is easy to see how some might think that the question
of Machiavelli’s relationship to feminism is hardly a question
at all. However, the question of Machiavelli is alive and well.
Many of the essays in Feminist Interpretations of Niccolò
Machiavelli are from established feminist theorists, beginning
with an excerpt from Hanna Pitkin’s groundbreaking Fortune
is a Woman. The roughly twenty years of feminist scholarship
on Machiavelli contained in the volume offers the reader a
convincing and sophisticated genealogy as well as a perceptive
sense of the major theoretical divisions among possible feminist
interpretations of this often controversial thinker. This edited
volume will be helpful for scholars of Machiavelli who may
not be well versed in feminist theory, but, more significantly,
it can be of use to feminist theorists developing approaches
to politics.
Pitkin’s chapter is taken from her 1984 book, the first
systematic feminist treatment of Machiavelli. She argues that
Machiavelli’s approach to the political is reminiscent of Aristotle,
though, Pitkin insists, “the very metaphors and images he
employs to convey his insights repeatedly distort or destroy” the
philosophical and political insights (53). While Machiavelli at his
best “envisions a free politics of citizens holding themselves and
each other to the civil limits defined by their particular tradition,
a tradition they recognize to be conventional yet honor or alter
as conscious ‘co-founders’” (79), this vision of politics is unable
to be sustained even by Machiavelli himself. Coupled with
Machiavelli’s defense of republicanism, then, is a “misogynist
ideal of manliness” as a basis of citizenship and an inability to
think of women as fellow citizens (70). Pitkin’s interpretation
forms the starting point of feminist analysis of Machiavelli, which
is evidenced by the other thinkers in the volume.
Arlene Saxonhouse’s interpretation, by contrast, emphasizes
the central ambiguity of Machiavelli’s politics. She complicates
the reading that Machiavelli relied on and reinforced strict
gender essentialism and the association of virtù with masculinity
by arguing that Machiavelli worked outside of the two models
of womanhood he inherited from Medieval thought (Mary and
Eve), suggesting that this is a part of a larger transvaluation in
his political philosophy. Machiavelli separates the governing
spheres of God and Fortuna, signaling “blasphemy” since, “in
medieval theology, Fortuna is an expression of divine will” (98).
As a critique of what Machiavelli saw as effeminate Christianity,
the feminine Fortuna is used as “the exhortation to action, rather
than submission to whatever she may bring” (98). In this way
“men must…become women in their capacity to be fickle” and,
rather than merely fight against and resist the feminine Fortuna,
must learn from her (98). She explains that the historical
account of women (as conspirators) in The Discourses and the
fictional account of women in the comedies suggest that for
Machiavelli men can become women and women men, as in
the case of Lucretia “fit to govern a nation,” thereby transvaluing
gender identity (115).
Wendy Brown disputes Pitkin’s connection of Aristotle
and Machiavelli by using his allegorical poem The Golden Ass
to conclude that “hardly a single feature of man is ‘natural’
or makes him fit to govern the natural world” (123) and that
politics is not a sign of man’s superiority over animals but, rather,
that man “constructs a political world out of his poverty—his
vulnerability, passion, and precarious bearing in the natural
world” (124). For Brown, gendered constructions of virtù and
Fortuna signify a battle between the imposition of form upon
matter (136), but they also suggest that for Machiavelli female
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power is in part “a mirrored image of man’s inadequacies”
(138). Necessity must be perceived in order for men to act
with virtù, for their natures incline them to self-destructiveness;
politics takes place in “a realm of appearances, as a game,
as theater” (140). Order comes about from the perception of
necessity and is “a strategy of defeating political alienation
with political power.” This is multifaceted because the order
“is Machiavelli’s masculine response to fluidity and change, a
response that intensifies man’s myopia, inflexibility, and need
to self-sufficiency, all of which were what originally produced
a threateningly incomprehensible world” (157).
According to Catherine Zuckert, the changeableness
of human nature is Machiavelli’s central insight into how
to conduct politics. She shows that Machiavelli depicts a
woman who is the embodiment of virtù and situates his retelling of Plautus’ play Casina in relationship to the historical
character of Lucretia and her importance in the founding
of Rome, arguing that Machiavelli reworks the concept of
prudence and its relationship to politics. The foresight shown
by Machiavelli’s female characters is emphasized; it is the
women that understand the basis of politics to be in “their
attachment to their own lives, property, and standing in the
eyes of others” (210). More reminiscent of Pitkin’s approach,
R. Claire Snyder employs a model of a “citizenship of civic
practices” to emphasize the role of civic militias in the formation
of citizens (214). Locating Machiavelli in the Citizen-Soldier
tradition, Snyder argues that “his republican virtues are
inextricably linked to a corresponding set of vices” (214) that
includes the establishment of the militia into the civic realm of
republican self-rule, amalgamating “armed masculinity onto
republican citizenship,” and embracing a form of citizenship
that is “simultaneously republican and militaristic” (218).
Snyder points out that the “constitution of masculine citizens
is never fully completed because once the civic republican
context is ruptured, men revert back to being self-interested
power-seekers” (233). According to John Shin, though, when
Machiavelli is talking about women, he is really talking about
a masculine ideal as functionality, or the negation of individual
life, which “places the abstract needs of the collectivity above
all other concerns” (290). The masculine ideal, then, is precisely
the opposite of what we often think. It is not uncompromising
individuality but total “disposability” (306).
In emphasizing the rhetorical dimensions of Machiavelli’s
work, Nederman and Morris reveal that the gendered violence
is more than a literary device and “complement[s] rather than
undermine[s] a political sphere in which ‘words are enough’
to solve problems” (277). This underscores the radicality of
Machiavelli’s break from the tradition of political thinking
that assumes that rational discussion is distinct from force
and highlights the interpretation that the contingency of the
world requires virtù, understood as forceful and masculine. By
contrast, Melissa Matthes re-reads the relationship between
force and Machiavelli’s republicanism by arguing that in La
Mandragola the “conspiracy to obtain Lucretia’s ‘consent’
parallels the consent of the people necessary for the founding
of the republic” (257).
Like Saxonhouse, Vesna Marcina takes the genderbending approach to Machiavelli, arguing that his conception
of citizenship is less masculine and exclusionary than many
feminists maintain. She situates this argument within the
“querelle des femmes” literary debate that surfaced following
Christine de Pisan’s Book of the City of Ladies. Marcina shows
how Renaissance defenses of women argued either that
women were as skilled as men or by privileging stereotypically
feminine qualities, and places Machiavelli’s use of women
in his works in this context. She also explains why feminists

should care about Machiavelli. In the first place, his rethinking
of submission within the context of civic virtue “can be used to
illuminate a genealogical study of submission and dependence,
their gendered associations, and their value connotations”
(332). Additionally, though, Machiavelli points toward an
alternative conception of democratic citizenship that has been
useful for many thinkers and may likely be useful to many
feminists in particular. As Jane Jaquette puts it, Machiavelli
can be “an interlocutor rather than a foil for feminist theory”
(338). Her chapter and the one by Andrea Nicki provide broader
considerations of the question of Machiavelli and feminism, and
both make strong cases for continued study of this important
thinker. In addition to being called everything “from protofascist
to protoliberal,” (2) in this important volume a complicated
Machiavelli emerges, from misogynist to protofeminist.

Jane Austen and the Enlightenment
Peter Knox-Shaw (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004). 275 pp. $75.00. ISBN: 0521843464

Reviewed by Monica Shores

George Washington University, mshores@gwu.edu
To love an author passionately is, in many ways, to regard her
much as one would a family member. There is a tenderness
and an intimacy that develops when one temporarily enters the
mind of another human being, particularly when that human
being is as articulate as Jane Austen. It is with this peculiar and
engaging dynamic that Peter Knox-Shaw undertakes the project
of recasting Jane Austen as a conscientious and receptive
woman of her time, instead of an “arch party-pooper” who longs
to return to a time when the Enlightenment had not corrupted
Europe with its socially disruptive ideas (3). As a scholar, he
is understandably put off by an incorrect reading of her work
simply because it is not academically sound. However, as a
lover of Austen’s work, he appears more affronted by the trend
of criticism, which does her a great disservice personally. The
Austen as “nostalgic reactionary” movement does both (i).
Knox-Shaw directs his critical energy primarily against
Marilyn Butler, who holds tremendous influence as a
contemporary critic. Butler has shaped the current thought of
Austen as a woman of “preconceived and inflexible” ideas, and
Knox-Shaw wastes no time in outlining the skeptical tradition,
housed within the Enlightenment, of which he believes Austen
was a part (4). David Hume and Adam Smith are referenced
early in this process, and later prove to be critical figures in
Austen’s congealing morality, as illustrated in her novels. Other
formidable figures are touched upon: William Cowper, William
Godwin, Erasmus Darwin. It is increasingly apparent that KnoxShaw has a tremendous amount of material to contend with.
Yet, oddly, it is in this same chapter, “Auspices,” that the book
engages an odd diversion from which it never quite recovers.
The book jacket boasts that Knox-Shaw utilizes “archival
and other neglected sources,” which is certainly an appealing
piece of scholarly bait, but these texts ultimately prove to have
more anecdotal appeal than revelations as to definite partisan
or religious positions of Austen’s, largely because they are not
works of her own. Jane becomes very much an afterthought
during this portion, where Knox-Shaw turns his attention to
James Austen’s poems and plays instead, written while he, the
oldest brother, and Jane were still living in the same household.
It becomes easy to recognize how much ink is devoted to this
endeavor when it is compared to the rest of the book; the single
largest section concerned with James spans twenty pages,
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which is equal in length to the chapter on Jane’s Northanger
Abbey and almost twice the length of the book’s final chapter.
When presented in this scope, the analysis of James’s
work, which surfaces frequently throughout the entire text,
becomes tedious and a distraction from Jane’s own pieces
instead of a supplement. Even Knox-Shaw himself makes this
diminished relevance explicit, usually when he seems to lack
a fluid transition back into a discussion of his original Austen’s
work. For instance, after dedicating four pages to writer Adam
Ferguson and how his essay influenced James’s circle of friends,
Knox-Shaw mentions, “Ferguson may or may not have been
among the many historians whom (Jane) read” (67). Yet he is
unable to resist including the information, perhaps because of
his familial allegiance to Austen’s work and, by extension, her
family’s. These types of vague conclusions stand in stark contrast
to the rest of the book’s more concrete and well-supported
assertions. Using her brother’s work to assist in outlining the
most influential literary works of the time is an admirable idea,
but in practice it is unable to sustain the momentum and import
of the rest of the book. Familiarity by association is plausible,
although not particularly compelling, and influence as opposed
to exposure would be the only basis strong enough to warrant
the amount of time given to those related to or simply acquainted
with Jane and the work they produce.
Knox-Shaw’s writing dramatically comes to life when he
allows himself to delve directly into Jane Austen’s texts with
the mission of poking holes in the Anti-Jacobian interpretations,
and he does so deftly, with great confidence and enthusiasm.
When he integrates points and ideas of the Enlightenment
directly with analysis of Austen’s work instead of refracting
these ideas through her brother James, his assertions take on
great authority. It is in these moments that the real work of the
book is done, namely, discrediting Butler as the designated
figurehead of the most tenacious “Austen as reactionary” school
of thought. On several occasions, Knox-Shaw refutes Butler, to
devastating effect, with Austen’s own text, such as when he pits
Butler’s assertion of “the sprightly heroine who renounces her
independence of mind in order to conform to a received view
of the world” to the final page of Pride and Prejudice, which
identifies the newly married Elizabeth Bennet as so “lively”
when talking with her husband that she induces “astonishment
bordering on alarm” in her sister-in-law (95).
Furthermore, Knox-Shaw casts an entirely different light
on what has been interpreted as Austen’s unforgiving nature
when it comes to her characters’ indiscretions: “Austen writes
about shame unblinkingly, exposing…its power of involving
the innocent. She shows that shame…is a rudimentary social
force, albeit one that cries out for humane meditation” (99).
Within this reading, a socially disruptive action and the negative
consequences it invites is a cycle not indicative of Austen’s
personal sense of justice but, rather, her sense of duty in
presenting a realistic social climate. Her insistence that “fictive
actions should tally with repeated observations from real life”
was so fierce that she “altogether avoided scenes in which men
confer together in the absence of women” (22).
Though the book purports to be intimately connected
enough with philosophy to have it mentioned under its first
Library of Congress categorization, in truth it is at various turns
a British history, a biography, and a literary analysis, but never
a philosophical work. Knox-Shaw calls upon philosophers
only in service of establishing the intellectual climate of
the Enlightenment, but an audience of philosophers will
undoubtedly find some enjoyment in the crediting of Smith and
Hume to Austen’s “two-tiered system of morality,” which allows
her to salvage “social benefits from a range of human energies
that had been sunk under the label of vice” (253).

Ultimately, Knox-Shaw ’s ideas are inarguably wellexplicated and convincing, and yet struggle to be experienced
as the dominant discourse of the book. His textual analysis and
commentary on Austen’s work are simply overshadowed by
the massive amount of historical background and references
within references that bracket every discovery. While this
historical density will certainly be of great appeal to some, it
is perhaps not in the best interest of his stated thesis that an
overabundance of information is provided, particularly when it
is not immediately relevant to Austen’s work. Jane Austen and
the Enlightenment is thoroughly researched and impressively
woven together, although these facets might have been more
readily appreciable had the book been titled The Enlightenment
and Jane Austen.

Feminist Interpretations of Hans-Georg
Gadamer
Edited by Lorraine Code (University Park, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003). 424 pp.
$85.00 cloth; $35.00 paper. ISBN: 0-271-02243-4.

Reviewed by Jamey Findling

Newman University, findlingj@newmanu.edu
In this volume, part of a series “Re-Reading the Canon,” Lorraine
Code has assembled a needed but somewhat uneven collection
of fifteen essays that deal with Gadamer and feminism. The best
of the contributions are certainly well worth reading, but many
of the entries fail to engage in genuinely productive ways with
Gadamer’s work. The intended audience seems to be feminists
who wonder whether it is worthwhile, in a crowded intellectual
marketplace, to read Gadamer seriously, and most of the
contributions here take one side or the other of this question.
However, judged from this perspective, the volume is only
partially successful. To be sure, readers are exposed to a lively
and at times productive debate about the value of Gadamer’s
work for feminist theorists. But the Gadamer who appears on
these pages is far too limited in scope. Readers of this volume
who are unfamiliar with Gadamer’s work might well conclude
that, outside of the second part of Truth and Method, he had little
of importance to say, at least with respect to feminist concerns.
In my opinion, this is a serious deficiency that renders this text
far less interesting and relevant than it might have been.
The volume begins with a well-crafted introduction in
which Code attempts to account for and respond to some of
the reservations feminists may have about reading Gadamer.
For the most part, these reservations stem from a perception
of Gadamer that has its roots in the well-known debate that
took place between Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas in the
1960s and 1970s, in which Habermas represented Gadamer as
both conservative and naïve. The former charge was based on
Gadamer’s attempt to “rehabilitate” the concepts of authority
and tradition as repositories of legitimate, meaning-producing
Vorurteile, or prejudices, while the latter charge held that
Gadamer had ignored the irrational and oppressive role of
power in the transmission of culture. While these concerns
were and are legitimate, Gadamer’s replies were generally
regarded as successfully showing that they did not substantially
undermine the concept of tradition that he had elaborated.
Nevertheless, the charges have persisted in various forms and,
indeed, have become rather widely accepted. Referring to
Gadamer as “conservative” is not likely to raise many eyebrows
these days. Hence, a sizable portion of this volume is concerned
with various considerations of whether Gadamer’s hermeneutic
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theory lacks adequate critical resources and, if so, how it might
be supplemented. The most representative examples of this line
of analysis are the contributions by Veronica Vasterling and by
Robin Pappas and William Cowling.
One of the more noticeable aspects of this volume was
how many of the authors focus on the question of Gadamer’s
utility for feminist goals and theorizing. The central issue for
these authors is, as Susan-Judith Hoffman puts it, Gadamer’s
“usefulness…for feminist projects” (84). (For other examples
of this type of language, see Fleming, 110; Hekman, 184; Alcoff,
232; Jantzen, 286; Steele, 335.) Without denying the possibility
that this approach can be productive (Steele’s essay is an
outstanding example in this regard), I would argue that adopting
such a posture exposes the author to the risk of appropriating
and even distorting Gadamer rather than interpreting him.
A clear example of the downside of this risk is the essay by
Gemma Corradi Fiumara. In “The Development of Hermeneutic
Prospects,” Fiumara takes Gadamer to task for giving primacy to
“the question,” which she calls “one of the most coercive figures
of language” (134). The problem with questioning, according
to Fiumara, is that it decides in advance what sorts of things
can and cannot be said by the one being questioned. She thus
contrasts it with the more open and, hence, riskier regard of
listening—which has, she says, been almost entirely neglected
in the Western tradition. In this way, Gadamer is neatly situated
within Fiumara’s pre-existing framework, made “useful” as
yet another example of how the domineering and risk-averse
tradition of Western philosophy has gone astray. Yet this
reading itself manifestly fails to listen to Gadamer, inasmuch as
Gadamer himself repeatedly warns against precisely the same
sort of domineering posture (questioning as interrogation) that
Fiumara attacks. In this connection, the essays by Marie Fleming
and Robin May Schott also have considerable critical axes to
grind but, in the process, unfortunately fail to give Gadamer’s
work an adequate hearing.
However, even authors who are sympathetic to Gadamer’s
thought sometimes seem to place their own political agendas
ahead of the task of interpretation. In “The Ontology of Change,”
Susan Hekman draws attention to the ontological dimension
of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, pointing out that for Gadamer
understanding is an ontological event that takes place within the
medium of language. Hekman also emphasizes that because the
“conversation that we are” is constantly changing, Gadamer’s
ontology avoids the modernist appeal to fixed, universal
standards of truth. But she misses the mark when she says
that Gadamer’s account “provides concrete strategies to effect
change” (195). In the first place, the notion that understanding
is an “event” reminds us that it is not the achievement of an
individual subject, let alone a process that could be brought
under any sort of discrete control. Furthermore, Gadamer
himself repeatedly disavowed any notion that his hermeneutics
could be read prescriptively as articulating any sort of definite
method by which to achieve correct understanding. Finally,
as Susan-Judith Hoffman rightly points out in her contribution,
Gadamer acknowledges the finite, situated character of human
understanding by affirming the “political incompetence” of
philosophy. In his view it is a basic misconstrual of philosophy
to assign it the task of proposing or promoting specific solutions
to social and political problems.
One other issue that is prominent in this volume is
Gadamer’s dialogical conception of understanding and the
related question of the status of the other in hermeneutic theory
(see, e.g., the contributions by Kathleen Roberts Wright, Georgia
Warnke, Fleming, and Fiumara). This is an important issue and
an obvious area for feminist reflection, but, like the discussions
of tradition, authority, and prejudice that many of the authors

in this volume frequently return to, this issue is also dealt with
almost exclusively on the basis of part two of Truth and Method.
This exclusivity is unfortunate, since Gadamer has much to say
elsewhere that is relevant to these questions (as the work of
James Risser clearly demonstrates).
As indicated above, there are a few contributions in this
volume that are genuinely rewarding. In particular, Georgia
Warnke, Meili Steele, and, to a certain extent, Linda Martín
Alcoff find compelling ways to deploy Gadamer’s thought
within the context of their own respective interests. While it
remains slightly misleading to characterize these essays as
“interpretations” of Gadamer, at least in the strict sense, these
authors are able to “use” Gadamer in ways that not only avoid
distorting his thought but, in some instances, even reflect light
back on it. Also worthy of mention here is Kathleen Roberts
Wright’s piece, which provides not only a careful response
to a feminist critique of Gadamer by Julie Ellison but also a
provocative and forward-thinking suggestion about Gadamer’s
place in the postcolonial world of the twenty-first century.
Finally, Grace M. Jantzen provides an interesting and wellwritten critique (following Irigaray’s critique of Heidegger) of
Gadamer’s emphasis on mortality to the exclusion of natality
in his conception of finitude and historicity.
As I have tried to make clear, the volume’s contributors
tend to engage with a rather narrow construal of Gadamer
and his work that is dominated by the concepts of tradition
and alterity as advanced in part two of Truth and Method. To
be sure, one can appreciate, for instance, the call for a more
critical hermeneutics (even if this is not new; see, e.g., the work
of Paul Ricoeur or, more recently, Hans-Herbert Kögler), but
there is also some redundancy here that a broader discussion
would have helped avoid. To mention only a few of the issues
that could have been addressed, or addressed more thoroughly:
First, the central position of language in Gadamer’s thought,
and especially his profound engagement with poetry, would
seem a promising avenue by which to approach questions of
the concrete, embodied character of knowing, inasmuch as
poetry for Gadamer expresses a truth that cannot be divorced
from the particular form of its expression. Second, Gadamer’s
extensive work in the history of philosophy provides a firm
basis for discussing his conception of tradition. In particular, his
radical and unconventional interpretations of Plato clearly show
that his notion of tradition has nothing at all to do with dogmatic
adherence to the past. Indeed, from this perspective, “re-reading
the canon” is as much a Gadamerian concern as a feminist one.
Finally, while the relationship between theory and practice in
Gadamer’s work is complex and not without ambiguity, it is
clearly of central importance there, as it is for feminist thought
as well. Gadamer’s disclaimer about the political incompetence
of philosophy needs to be questioned more incisively than it
has been, and feminist thinkers, attuned as they are to the often
covert practical commitments of theoretical claims, would
seem to be among those best positioned for such an inquiry.
In conclusion, there is ample opportunity for future
engagement on the part of feminist thinkers with Gadamer’s
work. One hopes that this volume will be a first step toward
an increasingly comprehensive and substantive effort to do
just that.
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Eight Women Philosophers: Theory, Politics,
and Feminism
Jane Duran (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press,
2006). 328 pp. $29.95. ISBN: 0-252-07265-0.

Reviewed by Maurice Hamington

University of Southern Indiana, mhamington@usi.edu
In “Why So Few Women Philosophers?” historian Gerda Learner
suggests that the dearth of women philosophers through
the nineteenth century is due to the systemic educational
disadvantage of women, material constraints, and the absence
of a robust women’s history.1 According to Lerner, the history
and works of women were often lost or discredited and
therefore not available for subsequent women to access and
build upon. It is indicative of the precarious position of feminist
philosophy that it remains necessary to argue on behalf of the
philosophical significance of historical women intellectuals.
Feminist theorists continue to be marginalized in certain
circles of philosophic thought, and yet, ironically, feminist
philosophy is the engine driving some of the most original
and transformative work in the field of philosophy. As Robin
May Schott describes, although feminist philosophy originally
sought rectifying the sexism in traditional philosophy, it “has
developed into a field that is reflective about methodology
in a way that contributes to making the field of the history
of philosophy profoundly philosophical.”2 Jane Duran’s Eight
Women Philosophers: Theory, Politics, and Feminism reflects
this kind of transformative contribution because in the process
of retrieving her subjects, Hildegard of Bingen, Anne Conway,
Mary Astell, Mary Wollstonecraft, Harriet Taylor Mill, Edith Stein,
Simone Weil, and Simone de Beauvoir, fundamental questions
about the nature, methods, and production of philosophy are
explored.
A central aspect of Duran’s analysis is a comprehensive
reflection on situatedness. She notes that the work of women
philosophers has “been even more influenced by context on the
whole than that of male philosophers” (11). The introduction to
Eight Women Philosophers makes it clear that the book will not
be encyclopedic presentations of eight independent figures but,
rather, tightly woven accounts thematically integrated. Given
this approach, I question Duran’s claim that “each chapter is
itself a stand-alone work” (x) given that she constructs such a
comprehensive comparative analysis. Of course, someone may
benefit from reading individual chapters, but this book really
should be read as a whole to fully appreciate the streams of
examination that Duran runs throughout the text.
Diversity of writing style and genre raises the specter of
inclusion—Who gets to be called a philosopher?—a recurrent
theme for Duran and a strength of the book. Each of the eight
chapters on women philosophers begins with an analysis of
the historical figure’s status within philosophy. In some cases,
the style and methodology of the thinker has led to her work
being underappreciated in philosophy. Neither Hildegard who
wrote in a visionary style (21), nor Astell whose political tracts
relegated her to “pamphleteer” (77) have received philosophic
acclaim. Duran does not merely report philosophical status but
investigates the nature of such claims. She notes, for example,
that if mystical genres were sufficient cause for ignoring the
philosophical nature of Hildegard’s work, then a number of
male philosophers should also be excluded (22). Questions of
inclusion go to the heart of the definition of philosophy and have
implications for whether the field will be robust and relevant
or abstract and esoteric.

Every chapter also addresses the relationship of the
writers to traditional philosophical categories and approaches.
For example, Conway’s metaphysics posits a hierarchy of
substances whereby God stands apart from creation and Christ
holds a mediating position. Conway viewed the structure of
creation as existing in a continuum of connection but each
mingling both matter and spirit. In this manner, Conway avoided
the problems faced by Descartes’ dualistic metaphysics (5156), offering philosophy with a “fresh and original air” (52).
Accordingly, Duran places each philosopher in conversation
with the traditional categories of philosophy whether their
work has been explicitly addressed as such or not. This process
serves to validate or justify the work as philosophical or worthy
of philosophical consideration, but one wonders about a
more radical project of reconceptualizing the categories of
philosophy.
Another strength of the book is Duran’s research into
each figure’s intellectual colleagues and, in particular, women
thinkers. In this manner, the reader is exposed to a number
of lesser-known intellectuals that might provide serviceable
subjects for further study. When addressing Wollstonecraft’s
work, Duran introduces Catherine Macaulay, a historian who
believed that there were no innate differences between men and
women and who had a profound influence on Wollstonecraft
(117-118). Better known is author George Eliot, a contemporary,
although not an acquaintance, of Harriet Taylor Mill. Eliot and
Mill shared a “concern about the individual in a cruel and
uncaring world, and the notion that we all, as individuals, can
help each other—we have the capacity to alleviate suffering”
(149). These connections display the range of Duran’s research
for Eight Women Philosophers, and, more importantly, they
demonstrate that women philosophers are not individual
disembodied voices but situated thinkers existing in a social
context that included responding to other women thinkers.
Every philosopher’s work is plumbed for its resonance
with contemporary feminist theory. Duran is even-handed in
her approach and does not force a feminist characterization
where it is not appropriate. While she describes Stein as writing
on a number of topics of importance to feminist theory and
practice, Duran acknowledges, “cast in today’s terms, Stein’s
thought cannot truly be considered feminist…because of her
reliance on Christian categorization” (179). Duran balances
recognition of women’s experience given the gender constraints
of a given historical period with an appreciation for language
that empowers women through feminist theory and practice.
The work of de Beauvoir has been thoroughly treated for its
contemporary limitations and essentialist underpinnings. Duran
recounts these claims, but she never veers far from recognizing
the role of context: “Contemporary feminists who have seen
The Second Sex only as a flawed precursor to later work are
failing to view the work in its entirety” (238). It is perhaps more
a tribute to what de Beauvoir set in motion that some of her
analysis seems dated. In this manner, Duran fleshes out recentday relevance for each figure’s work.
Duran thoughtfully problematizes numerous aspects of
philosophical context including history, culture, worldview,
and religion. One contextual consideration that Duran treats
is the nature of philosophical collaboration. Part of the
assumption of “philosophic voices from nowhere” is that
individuals write theory in a social vacuum. This assumption
is instantiated because history records names as forever
tied to their work as the one and only “author.” Throughout
Eight Women Philosophers, and particularly in its conclusion,
Duran addresses philosophic collaborations at length, a vital
topic given the various connections found among the eight
authors considered. Some of these collaborations are explicit
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and strong (de Beauvoir/Jean Paul Sartre and Harriet Taylor
Mill/John Stuart Mill); others are more muted yet significant
(Conway/Henry More). Such collaborations are “modes of
inquiry that are different from those pursued by the standard,
individual investigator” (255) and, while sometimes dictated by
circumstance, they point to an alternative feminist approach that
valorizes the power of collective philosophic creation.
Duran also continually identifies themes of resonance and
difference among her eight subjects. This is both a strength
and a weakness. On the one hand, comparing the various
figures, even over the span of 900 years, makes for a richer
understanding of each. On the other hand, I was left wondering
why these particular eight philosophers. Duran constructs
such an integrated whole that one could see the beginnings
of a counter-canon: Who gets in the feminist philosophy club?
Accordingly, and at the risk of appearing facile, I also wonder
if women of color could have been included in this project.
Duran addresses the ethnic and class mix of the philosophers
considered but, given that this project sought to retrieve the
intellectual work of women as philosophers, it would seem
plausible to extend it to those marginalized by race. Perhaps
this is the task of another project.
Overall, Eight Women Philosophers is an insightful exercise
in applying feminist theory and methodology, not merely as
analysis of history but because of its implications for the present.
Duran recognizes that there is an “unfortunate truth” that over
a half century after de Beauvoir declared that “being different
from man, who sets himself up as the same, it is naturally to the
category of the Other that woman is consigned”3 that feminist
projects of retrieval must continue (268); nevertheless, the
process is well worth it. All who are interested in the history of
feminist philosophy should read Eight Women Philosophers, and
it makes an excellent text for upper division undergraduate or
graduate level feminist philosophy or feminist theory courses.
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Situating the themes and questions addressed in Simone
de Beauvoir’s novel The Mandarins in the context of her
philosophical projects (most often, The Second Sex and The
Ethics of Ambiguity), Scholz and Mussett’s collection is a
valuable addition to Beauvoir scholarship, which also speaks
to broader political, philosophical, and aesthetic concerns.
Although The Contradictions of Freedom is a collection of
essays by eleven different authors, a handful of common and

frequently interrelated issues run throughout the book. Many
of these issues relate in some way to the idea expressed in the
title (a phrase from Iris Murdoch’s 1956 review of The Mandarins
for The Nation), namely, that for particular individuals situated
concretely in precise historical moments and social contexts
action can never be completely free or unquestionably
ethical.
The editors’ introduction summarizes the plot and some
of the main themes in the novel; this summary is complete
enough to ground a reader not immediately familiar with
The Mandarins. As it also references some of Beauvoir’s
autobiographies and letters to provide insight into her thoughts
on and purposes in writing the novel, the introduction is valuable
for readers familiar with The Mandarins because it situates the
novel in its historical context and in the context of Beauvoir’s
personal life and philosophical career. Of particular interest
is the editors’ research on the various reviews and critiques
of the book in both the European and American press. The
introductory essay shares with many of the other articles the
conviction that, in spite of its uniquely insightful portrayal of a
specific moment in twentieth-century history, The Mandarins is
relevant to contemporary concerns—if for no other reason than
the world of French intellectuals in the 1950s is not so different
from that of American intellectuals fifty years later.
While most of the essays draw comparisons between 1956
and 2006, this is the explicit focus of William L. McBride’s essay,
“The Conflict of Ideologies in The Mandarins: Communism
and Democracy, Then and Now.” Although there are some
notable differences, McBride argues that the issues faced
by Beauvoir’s characters—American cultural and economic
imperialism; a new, seemingly interminable “war”; European
unification—continue to be pressing concerns today. Moreover,
contemporary political discourse is largely shaped by what
McBride insightfully claims is the fruition of the mandarins’
nascent worries about the reach of American ideology: “The
major historical development of the past half-century has been,
in fact, the realization of one of the future possibilities envisaged
by a number of the book’s characters, namely, the triumph
of American hegemony” (41). Insofar as the “contradiction”
between Cold War superpowers has largely been resolved
and American neoliberal capitalism is unilaterally colonizing
the globe, the “freedom” which it claims to spread is, McBride
concludes, “false” (37).
The personal, political, and theoretical contradictions
experienced and addressed by (public) intellectuals are the
main concern of contributions by Ursula Tidd (“Testimony,
Historicité, and the Intellectual in Simone de Beauvoir’s The
Mandarins”), Karen Vintges (“The Return of Commitment:
Simone de Beauvoir’s The Mandarins Revisited), Gail Weiss
(“‘Politics Is a Living Thing’: The Intellectual’s Dilemma in
Beauvoir’s The Mandarins”), Sally J. Scholz (“Sustained Praxis:
The Challenge of Solidarity in The Mandarins and Beyond”), and
Sonia Kruks (“Living on Rails: Freedom, Constraint, and Political
Judgment in Beauvoir’s ‘Moral’ Essays and The Mandarins”).
Each of these essays addressed the contradictions emerging
from how the exigencies of concrete human existence
sometimes require the compromise of one’s ideals in order
to take needed political action, how intellectual engagement
requires compromise in personal and political relationships,
and how personal relationships change the significance of
political and intellectual ideals. In response, Tidd and Vintges
read Beauvoir through Foucault to suggest that intellectual
speech is a “practice of freedom” (Tidd, 87) or “ethical-political
(self) creation on the individual and collective level” (Vintges,
112). Weiss describes this ethos as a regard for politics as
a “living thing,” so that “the intellectual’s response to these
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dilemmas requires that she passionately embrace the ongoing
demands of communal life” (131). McWeeny’s account of
these “contradictions” is particularly insightful. Noting “the
male characters’ blindness toward the notion that the impasse
between intellectual theories and political practice must be
reconciled with particular human lives” (165), McWeeny argues
that these “impasses” are only viewed as such if one (wrongly,
from a very privileged perspective) assumes that one’s concrete
situation is never a barrier to political participation or intellectual
analysis (i.e., that one is “just a person” and not, say, “a Desi”
or “a dyke”).
Although it also addresses political questions, the second
half of the book is more historically oriented. Shannon M.
Mussett’s “Personal Choice and the Seduction of The Absolute in
The Mandarins” and Thomas W. Busch’s “Simone de Beauvoir
on Achieving Subjectivity” read The Mandarins in the context of
French existentialism and Merleau-Ponty; Jen McWeeny’s “Love,
Theory, and Politics: Critical Trinities in Simone de Beauvoir’s
The Mandarins” and Eleanore Holoveck’s “When a Woman
Loves a Man: Ownness and Otherness in The Mandarins”
address Beauvoir’s critiques of Hegelian and Husserlian
phenomenology, respectively. Peg Brand’s “Salon-Haunters: The
Impasse Facing French Intellectuals” is the only essay to address
The Mandarins in terms of aesthetics and the philosophy of
art. Even though the editors’ stated intent is to address the
philosophical (as opposed to literary) aspects of the novel,
because Brand’s essay sits at the end of the collection (like a
straggler) and is the only essay to explicitly address aesthetics,
it seems as though the collection discounts the extent to which
aesthetic concerns are themselves philosophical concerns.
Although the relationship between aesthetics and political
philosophy is directly addressed in only one essay, there are
two such themes which the essays in this collection address
indirectly: the philosophical significance of the novel’s style, and
the relationship between “frivolous” and “serious” intellectual
activity. The editors, Tidd, and Kruks address feminist or
methodological issues related to the novel’s style. Though
the first concern appears to be purely stylistic in nature, the
longstanding stereotype that women can create only on the
basis of experience and not from abstract concepts makes this
a feminist issue. Thus, we can see why, as the editors remark,
Beauvoir “adamantly refuses to agree with those who claim
that the book is nothing more than surreptitious autobiography”
(16). However, roman a clef need not be un-philosophical;
the above criticism of Beauvoir’s novel is not only misogynist
but based on a false dichotomy between concrete experience
and abstract concepts. Arguing that the relationship between
the novel and Beauvoir’s own life demonstrates a necessary
“reflexivity of the intellectual’s role” (88) or “self-critical
intellectual metacommentary” (88), Tidd demonstrates that
autobiographical reflection is an essential part of a sound and
ethical intellectual life. For Kruks, The Mandarins addresses
the seeming contradiction in writing a philosophical novel.
Kruks claims that Beauvoir rejects the philosophical or “thesisnovel” because “it contradicts the actual intent of a novel: ‘[A]
novel is about bringing existence to light in its ambiguities, in
its contradictions’ [1979b, 447]” (67). Like Beauvoir’s more
explicitly philosophical texts, The Mandarins demonstrates
that the human condition is fundamentally ambiguous; thus,
theories that would deny this are invalid and unjust.
The second theme follows from the dilemma faced by
several characters: whether to pursue intellectual activities
for political ends, or for aesthetic ones. Scrassine views it
as a zero-sum game, where one has time for either politics
or theory; Henri struggles with his desire to disengage from
public life and write solely for (his) pleasure; Nadine worries

that she will be “taken for a society woman who writes for
housewives” (Beauvoir 536; cited Brand, 221); Brand claims
that Beauvoir “worr[ies] that her writing might be judged as
an example of aestheticism—lighthearted and pleasant—and
not humanism” (221). Throughout the collection, authors
follow Beauvoir in dichotomizing political activity and “private”
aesthetic/theoretical work. For example, in their introduction,
the editors describe how Henri’s “foolish plans to write a ‘light
novel’ with no political significance give way to his true feelings
about the role of literature” (13) without problematizing the
assumptions behind Beauvoir’s characterization. No one
addresses the falseness of this dichotomy and the feminization
of this “lighthearted and pleasant,” “privatized” endeavor.
Although Kruks reads The Mandarins as a critique of Kantian
disinterestedness (70-72), no one questions the ways in which
the feminization of pleasure mirrors Kant’s gendered distinction
between the beautiful (“lighthearted and pleasant”) and the
sublime (virile, rational). Just as The Second Sex claims that
femininity is the “inessential” to the masculine One, is not art
here being feminized as “inessential” to the Absolute of public
life/freedom? Is not one of the “contradictions of freedom” the
need to balance political and aesthetic concerns?
In spite of these few criticisms, the various essays work
with and against one another to create a valuable scholarly text,
not just a textbook-like guide or companion to The Mandarins.
The range of interpretation and analysis is one of the strengths
of this collection because, as a whole, the book works to raise
questions for further scholarly inquiry and to perpetuate interest
in Beauvoir’s novel.
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Reviewed by Dera Sipe
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The Beauvoir Series is an earnest endeavor to pull Simone
de Beauvoir out from behind the veil of Sartre’s shadow once
and for all. This series is the most ambitious of many recent
attempts to persuade the philosophical community to take
Beauvoir seriously. The need for such a series is great; as
Edward Fullbrook rightly points out, “Until quite recently, getting
anyone to read a Beauvoir text for its philosophical content was
nearly impossible. And reading one with a view to finding in it
philosophical originality was deemed laughable. Beauvoir the
philosopher had been erased from existence” (34). Through the
use of fresh translations and by directing our attention to the
philosophical import of overlooked texts, this series calls on the
philosophical community to add Beauvoir’s name to the overtly
patriarchal canonical registry. Time will tell whether the series
is able to fully succeed in its goal, but the value of this project
can already be ascertained from the first book.
The series begins with Philosophical Writings, a collection
of Beauvoir’s lesser known, mistranslated, or previously
untranslated philosophical writings, to be followed by
translations of her student diaries, a war diary, several fictional
works, as well as literary, political, and feminist essays. In her
introduction to the volume, Simons argues that Beauvoir’s
“unique philosophical methodology” (5) requires that we
consider her formal philosophical essays as well as her fictional

— 25 —

— APA Newsletter, Fall 2006, Volume 06, Number 1 —
pieces, political articles, and even personal journals and
correspondences. This is, in part, because Beauvoir forces us
to curb the inclination to judge a philosopher on the basis of
a magnum opus. A just reading of her work requires that we
resist the temptation to assign her the sort of tidy conspectus
often distilled from philosophical systems; indeed, an accurate
understanding of her philosophy demands that we resist the
urge to systematize it at all. As Simons points out, “Beauvoir
argues that philosophy should reflect the ambiguities of actual
life” (2)—in line with this belief, her efforts to write philosophy
are not always done in treatise form.
With a few exceptions, Philosophical Writings focuses
primarily on Beauvoir’s essays but is structured such that the
methodology indicated by Simons is never ignored. Various
distinguished Beauvoir scholars aid this project with their
contextualizing introductions to each selection (Kristana
Arp, Nancy Bauer, Debra Bergoffen, Edward Fullbrook, Sara
Heinämaa, Eleanore Holveck, Sonia Kruks, Shannon Mussett,
Hélène N. Peters, Margaret A. Simons, Karen Vintges, and
Gail Weiss). The introductions lend intelligibility to the pieces,
situating them biographically and in relation to other texts.
However, due to their (perhaps necessary) brevity, the critical
commentary included in each introduction often comes
across hurried; this is vexing particularly when the author is
making controversial claims about the status of Beauvoir’s
work in relation to that of Sartre. In such cases, the reader
is pulled to investigate the subsequent texts for validation of
the commentator’s arguments. To some extent the task of an
introduction is to awaken interest in a text, so in this sense even
the occasional hyperbolic claim does a service for Beauvoir. Still,
the reader is left a bit dissatisfied at times. It is unfortunate that
the introductory sections are not full essays in themselves.
The contents of the book span from 1924 to 1947, ranging
from an essay written when Beauvoir was only sixteen to
her defense of existentialism. Situated chronologically, the
volume reveals both the coherence and the subtle progression
of her philosophical inclinations. While a system proper
should not be outlined from Beauvoir’s anti-systematic
corpus, central philosophical themes are traced by the book’s
commentators.
The earliest piece, “Analysis of Claude Bernard’s Introduction
to the Study of Experimental Medicine,” is probably the least
philosophically interesting, though it does provide rough
evidence that themes from her later work may be traceable
to her pre-Sartre schooldays. Simons and Peters point to three
such themes in their introduction to the essay: the “valuing
of philosophical doubt,” the “rejection of ‘scholasticism’,
‘immutable truths’, and philosophical system-building,” and
the “valuing of the discovery of the external world” (18). The
identification of particularly the latter two of these themes sets
the stage for the rest of the volume.
To demarcate Beauvoir from Sartre, subsequent
commentators continuously stress Beauvoir’s understanding,
further developed throughout her life but present in nascent
stages early on, of situatedness and the accompanying
ambiguity of the human condition. As early as She Came to
Stay (1938), Beauvoir’s philosophy explores the ambiguity of
embodied consciousness and the self/other relation, though,
unfortunately, she presents these solipsistically in the novel.
This matured a bit as Beauvoir cultivated an existential
ethics rooted in ambiguity, entering into what she termed her
“moral period.” Pyrrhus and Cineas (1944)—translated into
English for the first time here—is representative of this period.
Written approximately six years after She Came to Stay, Pyrrhus
and Cineas evidences Beauvoir’s growing consideration of
alterity. Debra Bergoffen introduces the text, situating Pyrrhus

and Cineas within the context of what Bergoffen finds to be the
general trajectory of Beauvoir’s thought and highlighting the
growing inclusion of intersubjectivity into Beauvoir’s existential
ethical scheme. Though in Pyrrhus and Cineas Beauvoir
clings to a somewhat Cartesian distinction between inner and
outer, she takes steps anticipatory of her later works toward
a phenomenological understanding of human freedom as
ultimately situated in the world and necessarily involving others.
Here, Beauvoir posits a notion of human freedom as supported
through reciprocal recognition: “Our freedoms support each
other like the stones in an arch, but in an arch that no pillars
support” (140). As Bergoffen points out in her introduction,
even the radically free subject must appeal to others so that
her projects might be realized in the world (85).
The works of Beauvoir’s “moral period” begin to broach
the topics of situatedness, ambiguity, and intersubjectivity, but
they do not quite go far enough; she has yet to fully situate the
human in a socio-historical world. Beauvoir’s later works will
develop these themes further, eventually abandoning the innerouter distinction for a more developed notion of embodiment
that better accounts for the ambiguity of our condition. This
development can be identified in a text published just one year
later, Beauvoir’s review of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of
Perception (1945). In her introduction to the review, Heinämaa
complicates the question of influence by exploring how
Beauvoir’s notion of subjectivity is actually more in line with
that of Merleau-Ponty than that of Sartre. Beauvoir seems to
prefer the former’s description of consciousness as “‘engorged
by the sensible’…not a pure for-itself…but rather ‘a hollow, a
fold’” (163). Beauvoir’s laudatory review of Merleau-Ponty’s
text indicates that her own philosophy has moved further in
the direction of situatedness. This development is apparent
in subsequent pieces included in Philosophical Writings,
particularly “Eye for an Eye,” but the reader must look outside
of this volume to find the most obvious indications of this
turn—namely, The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), of which only
an earlier published portion of the first chapter is included in
Philosophical Writings, and to The Second Sex (1949).
Thus, while this first volume works to affirm Beauvoir’s place
as a prominent philosopher in her own right, it should not be
read with the assumption that a comprehensive understanding
of Beauvoir’s philosophy can be garnered from even a close
examination of these texts in isolation. Rather, Philosophical
Writings should be read as an auxiliary text that provides the
English reader with trustworthy access to Beauvoir’s work on
the periphery of her larger, more familiar texts.
Fortunately, despite the suggestion indicated by the title, the
editors do not propose that this first volume’s aim is a complete
presentation of Beauvoir’s philosophical ideas. Simons offers
simply that the volume compiles “diverse elements of Beauvoir’s
philosophical work, ranging from metaphysical literature to
essays on existentialist ethics, and highlights continuities in the
development of her thought” (6). This volume accordingly does
Beauvoir a necessary justice on several fronts. Most importantly,
it does not merely speculate as to why Beauvoir has not been
taken seriously as a philosopher (a topic which has taken up
too many disheartening pages already)—it goes beyond that,
providing a forum for a conversation about just what Beauvoir’s
philosophy might be if we decide to take her seriously.
If the selections were chosen for this volume with the
intent of setting Beauvoir up as an independent thinker, the
goal was not met. Rather, the selections only amplify the
problem of influence: we see Beauvoir in conversation with
Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Bernard, Husserl, Heidegger, Hegel,
Kant, Descartes, Camus, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Bergson, and
Fouillée. However, is this not the mark of a good philosopher,
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especially a philosopher of intersubjectivity, of ambiguity, of
situatedness? That Beauvoir was never taken seriously as a
significant interlocutor in the philosophical conversation is
what is remedied with this book. The problem of influence—a
“problem” perhaps rooted in a patriarchal understanding of
what it means to engage in philosophy—should not be such a
problem for us if we truly endeavor to understand what Beauvoir
advocated. Given her philosophical convictions, Beauvoir would
have demanded nothing less than to be recognized as a vital
member of an engaged philosophical community.
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